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ABSTRACT
In the 2010-2011 school year, we implemented five strategies gleaned from practices in successful
charter schools – increased instructional time, a more rigorous approach to building human capital,
high-dosage tutoring, frequent use of data to inform instruction, and a culture of high expectations
– in nine of the lowest performing schools in Houston, Texas. We show that the average impact of
these changes on student achievement is 0.277 standard deviations in math and 0.062 standard deviations
in reading, which is strikingly similar to reported impacts of attending the Harlem Children’s Zone
and Knowledge is Power Program schools – two widely lauded charter organizations.









“If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre 
education performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.”  




In 2011, forty-eight percent of American schools did not meet the standards set out by the 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Usher 2011) – ranging from 11% in Wisconsin to 89% in 
Florida. Data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) – a set of assessments 
administered every two years to a nationally representative group of fourth, eighth, and twelfth 
graders – reveal that 33 percent of eighth graders are proficient in reading and 34 percent are 
proficient in math. Data for fourth and twelfth graders are similar. Among the 18 districts who 
participated in the Trial Urban District Assessment of NAEP, there is not one city in America in 
which even 25 percent of black students are proficient in either reading or math (Fryer 2011a). 
Improving the performance of American schools, especially those that are lagging the furthest 
behind, is of great social and economic importance (Auguste et al 2009, Fryer 2011a). 
There has been no paucity of effort aimed at increasing achievement and closing racial 
achievement gaps in the past few decades: lowering class size, increasing spending, and providing 
incentives for teachers are only a few of the dozens of ambitious policy prescriptions in education 
reform.
1 Moreover, school districts have taken a variety of targeted approaches to cope with 
“failing” schools. Between 2001 and 2006, Chicago closed 44 schools and reassigned students to 
other schools.  In New York City, the city closed 91 public schools between 2002 and 2010 – 
converting most of them to charter schools. In November 2005, 102 of the worst performing public 
schools in New Orleans were turned over to the Recovery School District (RSD), which is operated 
at the state level; some of these schools are currently run directly by the RSD while others are run by 
charter school operators. Tennessee created the Tennessee Achievement School District, which 
takes control of the lowest-performing schools across the state from the home district and 
centralizes the governance for these schools under this school turn-around entity. Despite these 
reforms to increase achievement, measures of academic success have been largely constant over the 
past thirty years (Fryer 2011a). This lack of progress has caused some to argue that schools alone 
cannot increase achievement or close the achievement gap (Coleman 1966, Ravitch 2010).  
                                                 
1 There have been many other attempts to close the achievement gap, none of which significantly or systematically 
reduce racial disparities in educational achievement (see Fryer 2011a, Jacob and Ludwig 2008).   
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Yet, due to new evidence on the efficacy of certain charter schools demonstrating that a 
combination of school policies and procedures can significantly increase achievement among poor 
black and Hispanic students, there may be room for optimism. Using data from the Promise 
Academy in the Harlem Children’s Zone – a 97-block area in central Harlem that provides myriad 
social programs along with achievement-driven charter schools – Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) show 
that middle school students gain 0.229 standard deviations (hereafter σ) in math per year and 0.047σ 
in reading. Thus, after four years, students in these schools have erased the achievement gap in math 
(relative to the average white student in NYC) and halved it in reading. Perhaps more importantly, 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) provide evidence that it is the school policies – not social programs – that 
are responsible for the achievement gains. Consistent with these findings, others have shown similar 
results with larger and far more diverse samples of charter schools that are not coupled with 
community programs (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, Angrist et al. 2010). 
A strategy to increase achievement and combat the racial achievement gap, yet to be tested, 
is to infuse the school policies exemplified in the most successful charter schools into traditional 
public schools. Theoretically, introducing school policies and procedures typified by successful 
charter schools in traditional public schools could have one of three effects. If the policies most 
correlated with charter school effectiveness are general lessons about the education production 
function and one can sidestep the many potential obstacles to reform in urban school districts – 
bureaucracy, politics, school boards, collective bargaining agreements, local community leaders – 
then these strategies may yield significant increases in student achievement. If, however, a large part 
of the success of the achievement-increasing charter schools we emulate can be attributed to 
selective attrition of unmotivated students out of these schools, the tendency of highly involved 
parents to enroll their children in charter school lotteries, or school policies that cannot be easily 
replicated in a traditional public school (e.g., firing ineffective teachers without due process or 
requiring them to work one-third more hours for no extra pay), then an attempt to create public 
schools in this image is likely futile. Third, some argue that major reform efforts are often more 
disruptive than helpful, can lower teacher morale, or might be viewed by students as punishment for 
past performance, any of which may have a negative impact on student achievement (Campbell, 
Harvey, and Hill 2000). Which one of the above effects will dominate is unknown. The estimates in 
this paper may combine elements from these and other channels.  
In the 2010-2011 school year, we implemented five correlates of effective charter schools 
described in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) – increased time, better human capital, more student-level  
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differentiation, frequent use of data to inform instruction, and a culture of high expectations – in 
nine of the lowest performing schools (containing more than 7,000 students) in Houston, Texas.
2 To 
increase time on task, the school day was lengthened one hour and the school year was lengthened 
ten days. This amounts to 21 percent more school than students in these schools obtained in the 
year pre-treatment and roughly the same as successful charter schools in New York City.
3 In 
addition, students were strongly encouraged and even incentivized to attend classes on Saturday. In 
an effort to significantly alter the human capital in the nine schools, 100 percent of principals, 30 
percent of other administrators, and 52 percent of teachers were removed and replaced with 
individuals who possessed the values and beliefs consistent with an achievement-driven mantra and, 
wherever possible, a demonstrated record of achievement. To enhance student-level differentiation, 
we supplied all sixth and ninth graders with a math tutor in a two-on-one setting and provided an 
extra dose of reading or math instruction to students in other grades who had previously performed 
below grade level. This model was adapted from the MATCH school in Boston – a charter school 
that largely adheres to the methods described in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). In order to help teachers 
use interim data on student performance to guide and inform instructional practice, we required 
schools to administer interim assessments every three to four weeks and provided schools with three 
cumulative benchmarks assessments, as well as assistance in analyzing and presenting student 
performance on these assessments. Finally, to instill a culture of high expectations and college access 
for all students, we started by setting clear expectations for school leadership.  Schools were 
provided with a rubric for the school and classroom environment and were expected to implement 
school-parent-student contracts.  Specific student performance goals were set for each school and 
the principal was held accountable for these goals. 
To estimate the impact of our experiment on student achievement, we use three separate 
statistical approaches to adjust for pre-intervention differences between treatment and comparison 
school attendees. We begin by using district administrative data on student characteristics, most 
importantly previous year achievement, to fit least squares models. This approach may not account 
for important student level unobservables, potential mean reversion, or measurement error in 
previous year test score, so we also estimate a difference-in-differences specification that can 
                                                 
2 In the 2011-2012 school year, we added eleven elementary schools in Houston and seven schools in Denver to our 
treatment sample. Data from these schools will be available in summer 2012.  
3 Using the data set constructed by Dobbie and Fryer (2011b), we label a charter school “successful” if its treatment 
effect on combined math and reading achievement is above the median in the sample, according to their non-
experimental estimates.  
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partially account for these concerns. Unfortunately (for statistical inference), Houston has a widely 
used choice program that allows students to attend any public school they want, subject to capacity 
constraints, which introduces the potential for selection into (or out of ) treatment. Following Cullen 
et al (2005), our third empirical model instruments for a student’s enrollment in a treatment school 
with an indicator for whether or not they are zoned to attend a treatment school. The results are 
robust across these three methods.
4  
The early results of our treatment are both informative and, in some cases, quite 
encouraging. In the grade/subject areas in which we implemented all five policies described in 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) – sixth and ninth grade math – the increase in student achievement is 
dramatic.  Relative to students who attended comparison schools, sixth grade math scores increased 
0.484σ (.097) in one year. In seventh and eighth grades, the treatment effect in math is 0.125σ (.065) 
and is statistically significant. A very similar pattern emerges in high school math: large effects in 
ninth grade and a more modest but statistically significant effect in tenth and eleventh grade, which 
suggest that two-on-one tutoring is particularly effective. The results in reading exhibit a different 
pattern. If anything, the reading scores demonstrate a slight decrease in middle school, though not 
statistically significant, and a modest increase in high school. Impacts on attendance – which are 
positive and statistically insignificant – are difficult to interpret given the longer school day and 
longer school year.  
Strikingly, both the magnitude of the increase in math and the muted effect for reading are 
consistent with the results of successful charter schools. Taking the treatment effects at face value, 
treatment schools in Houston would rank third out of twelve in math and fifth out of twelve in 
reading among charter schools in NYC with statistically significant positive results in the sample 
analyzed in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). 
Using data from the National Student Clearinghouse, we investigate treatment effects on two 
college outcomes: whether a student enrolled in any college (extensive margin) and whether they 
chose a four-year college, conditional on enrolling in any college (intensive margin). Calculated at the 
mean, students are 6.2 percentage points less likely to attend college, though the effect is not 
statistically significant.  Conditional on attending college, however, treatment students are 17.7 
percentage points more likely to enroll in a four-year institution, relative to a mean of 46% in 
comparison schools – a 40% increase. 
                                                 
4 An earlier version of this paper – Fryer (2011c) – also calculated nearest-neighbor matching estimates, which yielded 
similar results.    
 
5
We compliment our main statistical analysis with six robustness checks. First, we construct a 
simple falsification test by estimating the effect of attending our treatment schools in the pre-
treatment year. Second, we examine an alternative specification suggested by Rothstein (2009), by 
controlling for school-level average test scores. Third, we re-estimate our main specifications against 
several different constructions of the comparison group of schools. Fourth, we investigate the 
impact of treatment on an alternative (low stakes) test. Fifth, we detail the potential impact of 
sample attrition on our estimates. Sixth we analyze specific patterns in the testing data to detect 
whether there is any evidence of cheating in treatment schools. While the point estimates differ, the 
qualitative conclusions remain the same. 
The paper concludes with a speculative discussion about the scalability of our intervention 
along four important dimensions: politics, fidelity of implementation, financial resources, and labor 
supply of talent – though we do not offer firm conclusions. The biggest challenge, it seems, may be 
recruiting enough talented teachers and leaders to work in inner city schools. If the supply of 
properly motivated and sufficiently talented teachers and administrators is insufficient, developing 
ways to increase the human capital available to teach students through changes in pay, the use of 
technology, reimagining the role of schools of education, or lowering the barriers to entry into the 
teaching profession may be a necessary component of scalability. 
 
II. Correlates of Effective Charter Schools 
Charter schools are publicly funded, privately run schools that are playing an increasingly 
significant role in the field of public school reform, especially in large urban areas. As of the 2009-
2010 school year, more than 1.6 million students were attending 4,638 charter schools across the 
country.
5 When first conceived, charter schools offered two distinct promises: (1) to serve as an 
escape hatch for students in failing schools and (2) to use their relative freedom to be incubators of 
best practices for traditional public schools. Consistent with the latter characterization, successful 
charter schools use an array of intervention strategies, which include parental pledges of 
involvement and aggressive human capital strategies that tie teacher retention to value-added 
measures. 
Using remarkably rich data on the policies and procedures of 35 charter schools in NYC, 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) demonstrate that accounting for five factors – human capital, more 
                                                 




instructional time, how data is used to inform instruction, high-dosage tutoring, and a culture of 
doing whatever it takes to succeed – explains nearly half of the variance in charter school outcomes. 
Schools in their sample employ a wide variety of educational strategies and philosophies, providing 
important variability in school inputs. For instance, the Bronx Charter School for the Arts believes 
that participation in the arts is a catalyst for academic and social success. The school integrates art 
into almost every aspect of the classroom, prompting students to use art as a language to express 
their thoughts and ideas. At the other end of the spectrum are a number of so-called “No Excuse” 
schools, such as KIPP Infinity, the HCZ Promise Academies, and the Democracy Prep Charter 
School.  These “No Excuses” schools emphasize frequent testing, dramatically increased 
instructional time, parental pledges of involvement, aggressive human capital strategies, a “broken 
windows” theory of discipline, and a relentless focus on math and reading achievement (Carter 2000, 
Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003, Whitman 2008).  
To correlate schools strategies and policies with school effectiveness, Dobbie and Fryer 
(2011b) estimate models of the following form: 
                          
where    is an estimate of the effect of charter school s,     is an indicator for being a middle 
school, and     is a vector of school policies and school characteristics. The parameter of interest is 
  which measures the partial correlation of a given school characteristic on effectiveness.  
Appendix Table 1 recreates the main results in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). Schools that give 
formal or informal feedback ten or more times per semester have annual math gains that are 0.075  
(0.021) higher and annual ELA gains that are 0.054  (0.017) higher than other schools.  Schools that 
give five or more interim assessments during the school year and that have four or more 
differentiation strategies have annual math and ELA gains that are 0.078  (0.036) and 0.045  
(0.029) higher, respectively.  Schools that tutor students at least four days a week in groups of six or 
fewer have 0.069  (0.033) higher math scores and 0.078  (0.025) higher ELA scores. Schools that 
add 25 percent or more instructional time compared to traditional public schools have annual gains 
that are 0.084  (0.022) higher in math and 0.043  (0.024) higher in ELA. Whether or not a school 
prioritizes high academic and behavioral expectations for all students is associated with math gains 
that are 0.066  (0.028) higher than other schools and ELA gains that are 0.049  (0.019) higher per 
year.  A one standard deviation increase in an index of all five dichotomous variables is associated 
with a 0.056  (0.011) increase in annual math gains and a 0.039  (0.010) increase in annual ELA  
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gains. Perhaps most notably, the index measure explains approximately 50 percent of the variation in 
both math and ELA effectiveness. 
Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) further demonstrate that their main results are unchanged when 
accounting for three alternative theories of schooling: a model emphasizing the social and emotional 
needs of the “whole child” through wrap-around services and parental engagement, a model focused 
solely on the selection and retention of teacher talent, and the so-called “No Excuses” model of 
education, are robust to accounting for 37 other control variables, and qualitatively similar in a larger 
sample of charter schools in NYC, using more coarse administrative data from site visits, state 
accountability reports, and school websites. These robustness checks provide some evidence that the 
five correlates of effective charter schools may be capturing important information on the inner 
workings of schools, though they are simple correlations. Experimental validation is needed. 
 
III. Background and Project Details  
 
A. Houston Independent School District  
Houston Independent School District (HISD) is the seventh largest school district in the 
nation with 202,773 students and 298 schools. Eighty-eight percent of HISD students are black or 
Hispanic. Roughly 80 percent of all students are eligible for free or reduced price lunch and roughly 
30 percent of students have limited English proficiency.  
  Like the vast majority of school districts, Houston is governed by a school board that has 
the authority to set a district-wide budget and monitor the district's finances; adopt a personnel 
policy for the district (including decisions relating to the termination of employment); enter into 
contracts for the district; and establish district-wide policies and annual goals to accomplish the 
district's long-range educational plan, among many other powers and responsibilities.  The Board of 





In 2010, four Houston high schools were declared Texas Title I Priority Schools, the state-
specific categorization for its “persistently lowest-achieving” schools, which meant that these  
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schools were eligible for federal School Improvement Grant (SIG) funding.
6 In addition, five middle 
schools were labeled “academically unacceptable” under the Texas Accountability Ratings. 
Unacceptable schools were schools that had proficiency levels below 70 percent in reading/ELA, 70 
percent in social studies, 70 percent in writing, 55 percent in mathematics, and 50 percent in science; 
that had less than a 75 percent completion rate; or had a drop-out rate above 2 percent.
7 Relative to 
average performance in HISD, students in these schools pre-treatment performed 0.408σ lower in 
math, scored 0.390σ lower in reading, and were 22 percentage points less likely to graduate. 
 
Comparison Schools 
As a part of its Academic Excellence Indicator System, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) 
selects a 40-school comparison group for every public school in Texas.  The reports are designed to 
facilitate comparisons between schools with similar student bodies on a diverse set of outcomes, 
including: standardized testing participation and results; school-wide attendance rates; four-year 
completion rates; drop-out rates; a measure of progress made by English Language Learners; and 
several indicators of college readiness. 
  When constructing comparison groups for each school, TEA selects the forty Texas schools 
that bear the closest resemblance in the racial composition of their students, the percentage of 
students receiving financial assistance, the percentage of students with limited English proficiency, 
and the percentage of “mobile” students based on the previous year’s attendance.  These groupings 
form the basis of our comparison sample.  We identify 15 Houston high schools and 19 Houston 
middle schools that are included in the TEA comparison group for one or more treatment schools.  
Of these 34 schools, 13 were deemed “academically acceptable”, 15 “recognized” and 6 “exemplary” 
based on results from the 2009-2010 school year.
8  Throughout the paper, we will refer to these 
                                                 
6These SIG funds could be awarded to any Title I school in improvement, corrective action, or restructuring that was 
among the lowest five percent of Title I schools in the state or was a high school with a graduation rate below sixty 
percent over several years; these are referred to as Tier I schools.  Additionally, secondary schools could qualify for SIG 
funds if they were eligible for but did not receive Title I, Part A funding and they met the criteria mentioned above for 
Tier I schools or if they were in the state's bottom quintile of schools or had not made required Annual Yearly Progress 
for two years; these are referred to as Tier II schools.   
7 Additionally, schools could obtain a rating of "academically acceptable" by meeting required improvement, even if they 
did not reach the listed percentage cut-offs or by reaching the required cut-offs according to the Texas Projection 
Measure (TPM).  The TPM is based on estimates of how a student or group of students is likely to perform in the next 
high-stakes assessment. 
8 Recall that the treatment schools represent all “academically unacceptable” middle and high schools in HISD. No strict 
comparison group exists in Houston that matches our treatment schools on this criteria.  
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schools as the “comparison group.” In section VII, we show that the results are robust to alternative 
constructions of the comparison schools.  
  Appendix Figure 1 displays the geographic location of the schools in our treatment and 
comparison groups on a map of Houston.  The background color indicates the poverty rate for each 
census tract, with darker shades denoting higher poverty levels.  The letter “T” indicates treatment 
schools and “C” denotes comparison schools.  The figure demonstrates that our sample draws on 
students throughout the poorest regions of Houston. 
 
C. Program Details 
Table 1 provides a bird’s eye view of our experiment. Appendix A, an implementation guide, 
provides further experimental details and implementation milestones reached. Fusing the recipe 
developed in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) with the political realities of Houston, its school board, and 
other local considerations, we developed the following five-pronged intervention designed to inject 
best practices from successful charter schools into failing public schools. 
 
Extended Learning Time   
The school year was extended 10 days – from 175 for the 2009-2010 school year to 185 for 
the 2010-2011 year. The school day was extended by one hour each Monday through Thursday. 
Panel A of Figure 1 demonstrates that, in total, treatment students were in school 1537.5 hours for 
the year compared to an average of 1272.3 hours in the previous year – an increase of 21 percent. 
For comparison, the average charter school in NYC has 1402.2 hours in a school year and the 
average successful charter school has 1546.0 hours. Importantly, because of data limitations, this 
does not include instructional time on Saturday. Treatment schools strongly encouraged, and even 
incentivized, students to come to school six days a week to further increase instructional time. The 
prevalence of Saturday school in comparison schools is unknown. 
 
Human Capital 
  Leadership Changes: 
  All principals were replaced in treatment schools; compared to approximately one-third of 
those in comparison schools. To find effective leadership for each campus, principals were initially 
screened based on their past record of achievement in former leadership positions. Those with a 
record of increasing student achievement were also given the STAR Principal Selection Model™  
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from The Haberman Foundation to assess their values and beliefs. Individuals who passed these 
initial two screens (roughly 200), were interviewed by the author and the superintendent of schools 
to ensure the leaders possessed characteristics consistent with leaders in successful charter schools. 
 
  Staff Removal: 
In Spring 2010, we collected four pieces of data on each teacher in our nine treatment 
schools. The data included principal evaluations of all teachers from the previous principal of each 
campus (ranking them from low performing to highly effective), an interview to assess whether each 
teacher's values and beliefs were consistent with teachers in successful charter schools, a peer-rating 
index, and value-added data, as measured by SAS EVAAS®, wherever available.
 9  Value-added data 
are available for just over 50 percent of middle school teachers in our sample. For high schools, 
value-added data are available at the grade-department level in core subjects. 
  Appendix A provides details on how these data were aggregated to make decisions on who 
would be offered the opportunity to remain in a treatment school. In total 52 percent (or 310) 
teachers did not return to the nine schools – 162 were removed and 148 left on their own.
10 These 
teachers were not simply reallocated to other district schools; HISD spent over $5 million buying 
out teacher contracts.
11 Panel B of Figure 1 compares teacher departure rates in treatment and 
comparison schools. 
  Between the 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 school years, teacher departure rates declined from 
27 percent to 20 percent in treatment schools and 22 percent to 12 percent in comparison schools. 
In the pre-treatment year (2009-2010) comparison schools continued their downward trend, while 
52 percent of teachers in treatment schools did not return. To get a sense of how large this is, 
consider that this is about as much turnover as these same schools had experienced cumulatively in 
the preceding three years. 
  Panel C of Figure 1 shows differences in value-added of teachers on student achievement for 
those that remained at treatment schools versus those that left, by subject, for teachers with valid 
                                                 
9 Within the teacher interview, each teacher was asked to name other teachers within the school who they thought to be 
necessary to a school turnaround effort.  From this, we were able to construct an index of a teacher’s value as perceived 
by her peers. 
10 If one restricts attention to reading and math teachers, teacher departure rates are 60 percent 
11 One might worry that these teachers simply transferred to comparison schools and that our results are therefore an 
artifact of teacher sorting.  Two facts argue against this hypothesis.  First, only 2.5% of teachers in comparison schools 
worked in treatment schools in the pre-treatment year.  Second, our results are robust to alternative constructions of 
comparison schools, including using the entire district.  Teachers who left treatment schools but remained in the district 
during the treatment year represent 1.25% of teachers in HISD.  
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data. Two observations seem clear. First, in all cases, teachers who remained in treatment schools 
had higher average value added than those who left. However, aggregately, the teachers who remain 
still average negative value-added across four out of five subject areas.  
 
  Staff Development and Feedback 
  In order to develop the skills of the staff remaining in and brought into the treatment 
schools, a four-pronged professional development plan was implemented throughout the 2010-2011 
school year. Over the summer, all principals coordinated to deliver training to all teachers around 
the effective instructional strategies developed by Doug Lemov of Uncommon Schools, author of 
Teach Like a Champion, and Dr. Robert Marzano, a highly regarded expert on curriculum and 
instruction.  The second prong of the professional development model was a series of sessions held 
on Saturdays throughout the fall of 2010 designed to increase the rigor of classroom instruction and 
address specific topics such as lesson planning and differentiation. The third component was 
intended specifically to help inexperienced teachers develop a “toolbox” for classroom management 
and student engagement. 
  The fourth prong of professional development -- and one of the most important 
components of successful schools identified in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) -- was the feedback given 
to teachers by supervisors on the quality of their instruction. In most of the treatment schools, 
teachers reported that they were frequently observed by school and instructional leaders and that 
they received prompt, concrete feedback on instructional practices after these observations.   
 
High Dosage Tutoring 
Highly successful charters provide their students with differentiation in a variety of ways – 
some use technology, some reduce class size, while others provide for a structured system of in-
school tutorials. In an ideal world, we would have lengthened the school day two hours and used the 
additional time to provide two on one tutoring in both math and reading. This is the model 
developed by Michael Goldstein at the MATCH school in Boston.  
Due to budget constraints, we were only able to lengthen the school day one hour and tutor 
in one grade. We chose sixth and ninth grades in an effort to get students up to grade level when  
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they entered middle and high school, and we chose math over reading because of the availability of a 
solid curriculum and knowledge map that is easily communicated to first time tutors.
12 
For all sixth and ninth grade students, one period Monday through Thursday was devoted to 
receiving two-on-one tutoring in math. The total number of hours a student was tutored was 
approximately 189 hours for ninth graders and 215 hours for sixth graders. All sixth and ninth grade 
students received a class period of math tutoring every day, regardless of their previous math 
performance.  The tutorials were a part of the regular class schedule for students, and students 
attended these tutorials in separate classrooms laid out intentionally to support the tutorial program. 
There were two important assumptions behind the tutoring model: first, it was likely that all students 
in failing schools could benefit from high-dosage tutoring, either to remediate deficiencies in 
students’ math skills or to provide acceleration for students already performing at or above grade 
level; second, including all students in a grade in the tutorial program was thought to remove the 
negative stigma often attached to tutoring programs that are exclusively used for remediation. 
In non-tutored grades – seven, eight, ten, eleven, and twelve – students who tested below 
grade level received a “double dose” of math or reading in the subject in which they were the 
furthest behind. This provided an extra 189 hours for high school students and 215 hours for 
middle school students of instruction for students who are below grade level. The curriculum for the 
extra math class was based on the Carnegie Math program.  The Carnegie Math curriculum uses 
personalized math software featuring differentiated instruction based on previous student 
performance.  The program incorporates continual assessment that is visible to both students and 
teachers. The curriculum for the extra reading class utilized the READ 180 program.  The READ 
180 model relies on a very specific classroom instructional model: 20 minutes of whole-group 
instruction, an hour of small-group rotations among three stations (instructional software, small-
group instruction, and modeled/independent reading) for 20 minutes each, and 10 minutes of 
whole-group wrap-up.  The program provides specific supports for special education students and 
English Language Learners.   The books used by students in the modeled/independent reading 
station are leveled readers that allow students to read age-appropriate subject matter at their tested 
lexile level.  As with Carnegie Math, students are frequently assessed to determine their lexile level in 
order to adapt instruction to fit individual needs. 
 
                                                 
12 Another motivation for this design is that the elementary schools that entered during the second year of 
implementation (2011-2012) are not in the feeder patterns of the middle schools.  
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Data Driven Instruction 
In the 2010-2011 school year, schools individually set their plans for the use of data to drive 
student achievement.  Some schools joined a consortium of local high schools and worked within 
that group to create, administer, and analyze regular interim assessments that were aligned to the 
state standards.  Other schools used the interim assessments available through HISD for most 
grades and subjects that were to be administered every three weeks.   
  Additionally, the program team assisted the schools in administering three benchmark 
assessments in December, February, and March. These benchmark assessments used released 
questions and formats from previous state exams.  The program team assisted schools with 
collecting the data from these assessments and created reports for the schools designed to identify 
the necessary interventions for students and student groups.  Based on these assessment results, 
teachers were responsible for meeting with students one-on-one to set individual performance goals 
for the subsequent benchmark and ultimately for the end-of-year state exam. 
 
Culture of High Expectations  
Of the five policies and procedures changed in treatment schools, the tenet of high 
expectations and an achievement-driven culture is the most difficult to quantify. Beyond hallways 
festooned with college pennants and littered with the words “No Excuses,” “whatever it takes,” and 
“there are no short-cuts,” there are several ways to suggest that a change in culture took place. First, 
all treatment schools had a clear set of goals and expectations set by the Superintendent.  In one-on-
one meetings, all principals were instructed that the expectation for their campus was that 100 
percent of students were to be performing at or above grade level and be in attendance 95 percent 
of all school days within three years.  In the treatment high schools, there were three additional 
goals: 100 percent graduation rate, every graduate taking at least one advanced placement course, 
and every senior being accepted to a four-year college or university. All teachers in treatment schools 
were expected to adhere to a professional dress code.  Schools and parents signed “contracts” – 
similar to those employed by many successful charter schools – indicating their mutual agreement to 
honor the policies and expectations of treatment schools in order to ensure that students succeed. 
Appendix Figure 2 provides a sample of a parent contract. As in high-performing charters, the 
contract is not meant to be enforced – only to set clear expectations. 
  Many argue that expectations for student performance and student culture are set, in large 
part, by the adults in the school building (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003). Recall, all principals  
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and more than half of teachers were replaced with individuals who possessed values and beliefs 
consistent with an achievement-driven philosophy. Teachers in treatment schools were interviewed 
as to their beliefs and attitudes about student achievement and the role of schools; answers received 
relatively higher scores if they placed responsibility for student achievement more on the school and 
indicated a belief that all students could perform at high levels.  Panel D of Figure 1 demonstrates 
the differential patterns in answers by those teachers who left these nine schools and those who 
remained.  For each of the five domains of questions - No Excuses, Alignment with Mission, 
Student Achievement, Commitment to Students, and Student Motivation – teachers remaining in 
these schools scored higher than those teachers leaving the schools. 
 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use administrative data provided by the Houston Independent School District (HISD). 
The main HISD data file contains student-level administrative data on approximately 200,000 
students across the Houston metropolitan area.  The data include information on student race, 
gender, free and reduced-price lunch status, behavior, attendance, and matriculation with course 
grades for all students, TAKS math and ELA test scores for students in third through eleventh 
grade, and Stanford 10 subject scores in math, reading, science, and social studies for students in 
kindergarten through 10
th grade. We have HISD data spanning the 2003-2004 to 2010-2011 school 
years. 
The TAKS math and ELA tests, developed by the Texas Education Agency, are statewide 
high-stakes exams conducted in the spring for students in third through eleventh grade.
13  Students 
in fifth and eighth grades must score proficient or above on both tests to advance to the next grade, 
and eleventh graders must achieve proficiency to graduate. Because of this, students in these grades 
who do not pass the tests are allowed to retake it six weeks after the first administration. Where it 
exists, we use a student’s score on the first retake in our analysis.
14 
The content of the TAKS math assessment is divided among six objectives for students in 
grades three through eight and ten objectives for students in grades nine through eleven. Material in 
the TAKS reading assessment is divided among four objectives in grades three through eight and 
three objectives in grade nine. The ninth grade reading test also includes open ended written 
                                                 
13 Sample tests can be found at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/released-tests/ 
14 Whether we use the maximum score, the mean score, or the first score does not alter our results.  
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responses. The TAKS ELA assessment covers six objectives for tenth and eleventh grade students. 
The ELA assessment also includes open ended questions as well as a written composition section.
15  
All public school students are required to take the math and ELA tests unless they are 
medically excused or have a severe disability.  Students with moderate disabilities or limited English 
proficiency must take both tests, but may be granted special accommodations (additional time, 
translation services, and so on) at the discretion of school or state administrators.  In our analysis the 
test scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade 
and year. 
To explore the impact of treatment on college enrollment, we match the HISD 
administrative records with information on college attendance available from the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a non-profit organization that maintains enrollment information for 92 
percent of colleges nationwide. The NSC data contain information on enrollment spells for all 
covered colleges that a student attended, though not grades or course work. The HISD 
administration data were matched to the NSC database by NSC employees using each student’s full 
name, date of birth and high school graduation date, which the NSC used to match to its database. 
Students who are not matched to the NSC database are assumed to have never attended college. 
Additionally, slightly less than 1% percent of records in our sample were blocked by the student or 
student’s school. Students in treatment schools are no more or less likely to have a record blocked 
than students in comparison schools.  
We use a parsimonious set of controls to help correct for pre-treatment differences between 
students in treatment and comparison schools. The most important controls are reading and math 
achievement test scores from the previous year, which we include in all regressions (unless otherwise 
noted). Previous year test score is available for most students who were in the district in the previous 
year (see Table 2 for exact percentages of treatment and comparison students who have valid test 
scores from the previous year). We also include an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if 
a student is missing a test score from the previous year and takes on the value of zero otherwise.  
Other individual-level controls include gender; a mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive set of race dummies; and indicators for whether a student is eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch
16 or other forms of federal assistance, whether a student receives accommodations for 
                                                 
15Additional information about TAKS is available at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/taks/.  
16 A student is income-eligible for free lunch if her family income is below 130 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, 
or categorically eligible if (1) the student’s household receives assistance under the Food Stamp Program, the Food 
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR), or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program  
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limited English proficiency, whether a student receives special education accommodations,
17 or 
whether a student is enrolled in the district’s gifted and talented program.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on individual student characteristics for our 
nine treatment schools (column 1), thirty-four comparison schools (column 2), and the ninety-six 
non-treatment middle and high schools in HISD (column 5). Columns 3 and 5 provide p-values for 
tests of equality in means of treatment and comparison and treatment and HISD, respectively. 
In general, treatment schools have more minority students, more students requiring special 
education accommodations, and fewer students enrolled in gifted and talented programs.  Treated 
students also scored much lower on every test we consider in the pre-treatment year.  While some of 
these differences persist after treatment, they are narrowed in every case and eliminated for the Math 
TAKS. 
Panel B presents summary statistics for school-level variables that were collected pre-
treatment.  Attendance rates are measured as the total number of presences divided by the total 
number of school days during which a student is enrolled in each school. Total suspensions include 
both in-school and out-of-school suspensions, and a high school’s baseline four-year graduation rate 
is defined as the percentage of the 2006-2007 ninth grade class that graduates in the 2010, omitting 
students who move outside the district or enroll in charter or private schools.  
Treatment schools score lower on several indicators of school quality. In general, teachers at 
these schools are less experienced and achieve lower test score gains, though only the difference in 
math value-added is statistically significant, and only when compared to the whole of HISD.   
Graduation rates are starkly lower in treatment schools (38.5 percent as opposed to 53.1 percent in 
comparison schools and 60.5 percent in the HISD sample), while attendance rates are slightly lower 
(91.3 percent as opposed to 92.9 percent and 93.3 percent). 
 
V. Econometric Approach 
                                                                                                                                                             
(TANF); (2) the student was enrolled in Head Start on the basis of meeting that program’s low-income criteria; (3) the 
student is homeless; (4) the student is a migrant child; or (5) the student is identified by the local education liason as a 
runaway child receiving assistance from a program under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act. 
17 Determination of special education or ELL status is done by HISD Special Education Services and the HISD 
Language Proficiency Assessment Committee.  
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  In the absence of a randomized experiment, we implement three statistical approaches to 
adjust for pre-intervention differences between treatment and comparison schools. The first and 
simplest model we estimate is a linear specification of the form: 
(1)  g s i g i s g s i X treatment score , , 2 1 0 , ,              
Where i indexes students, s schools, and g grades; treatment is a binary variable equal to one if a 
student begins the 2010-2011 school year in a treatment school.   Equation (1) is a simple and easily 
interpretable way to obtain estimates of the effect the treatment on student achievement.
18 
  These estimates will be biased in the presence of unobserved confounding variables or 
significant measurement error in previous year test scores. For instance, if students in comparison 
schools have more motivated parents or better facilities, then our estimates will be biased. Moreover, 
our ability to control for potentially important school level inputs such as teacher quality, class 
disruptions, and so on, is severely limited. One potential way to account for these and other 
unobservables is to focus on the achievement gains between the pre-treatment and treatment years 
for treatment and comparison students. 
For our second empirical model we calculate a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator of 
the form: 
(2)      g s i g i s g s i X treatment score , , 2 1 0 , ,              , 
where g s i score , ,  denotes the year-over-year change in score for student i. 
  An important potential limitation of the two empirical models described thus far is potential 
selection into (or out of) treatment schools. HISD has an open enrollment policy allowing any 
student in the district to attend any school they want, subject to capacity constraints. Although the 
design of our experiment occurred at the tail end of the 2009-2010 school year, it is plausible – if not 
likely – that removing 310 teachers and 9 principals caused enough commotion that some parents 
decided to choose another school for their children over the summer. The longer hours and longer 
school year likely encouraged or discouraged others from attending.  Theoretically, even the 
direction of the potential bias is unclear. 
  To understand the nature of selection into or out of our treatment schools, we investigate 
the distribution of achievement test scores for the incoming sixth and ninth grade cohorts between 
                                                 
18 Rothstein (2009) demonstrates that the average SAT score at a student’s high school explains more of the variance of 
college outcomes than the student’s own SAT score.  We discuss the robustness of our results to the inclusion of school-
level average test scores in Section VII.  
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the 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 school years. The results of this exercise are detailed in Appendix 
Figures 3A and 3B for middle and high schools, respectfully. In the sixth grade, reading scores of 
students entering treatment schools has been on the decline for the past four years, but declined 
more sharply for the cohort getting treatment. Math scores follow a similar, though more 
pronounced pattern, declining .135  relative to the pre-treatment year. Incoming ninth grade scores, 
depicted in Appendix Figure 3B, show a remarkable decline in the achievement of incoming 
freshman in the treatment year relative to the previous year – a .219  decrease in math and a .138  
decrease in reading.  
We therefore instrument for attending a treatment school with whether a student is zoned to 
attend a treatment school.  While students are free to choose the school they attend, the zoning 
system creates a default option that may influence students’ schooling decisions. Cullen et al. (2005) 
use a similar instrument to estimate the impact of school choice on student outcomes. 
The first stage equation expresses enrollment in a treatment school as a function of an 
indicator for whether a student is zoned to a treatment school (zonedi), a grade fixed effect ( g  ), and 
our parsimonious set of controls with the addition of a linear, quadratic, and cubic term for the 
distance between a student’s home address and the nearest eligible treatment school (middle school 
for students in grades six through eight and high school for students in grades nine through twelve). 
In symbols: 
(3)  i g i i g s i X zoned treatment             2 1 0 , ,  
The residual of this equation captures other factors that are correlated with enrollment in a 
treatment school and may be related to student outcomes. The key identifying assumptions of our 
approach are that (1) living in a treatment school’s enrollment zone is correlated with enrolling in a 
treatment school and (2) conditional on living a certain distance from a treatment school, zoning 
affects student achievement through its effect on the probability of enrollment in a treatment 
school, not through any other factor or unobserved characteristic. 
  The first assumption is testable. Appendix Table 2 summarizes our first stage results.  In 
each specification, living in a treatment zone strongly predicts enrollment in a treatment school, 
even after controlling for distance between a student’s home and the nearest treatment school.  The 
first-stage F-statistics are also large, which suggests that our instrument is strong enough to allow for 
valid inference.  
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  The validity of our second assumption – that the instrument only affects student outcomes 
through the probability of enrollment – is more difficult to assess. To be violated, the student’s 
home zone must be correlated with outcomes after controlling for the student’s background 
characteristics, including distance from the nearest treatment school. This assumes, for instance, that 
parents do not selectively move into different treatment zones upon learning of the treatment. 
Motivated parents can enroll their children in a treatment school no matter where they live and 
receive free transportation from HISD; the relationship between distance to a treatment school and 
enrollment comes about primarily through the cost of attending, not eligibility. We also assume that 
any shocks – for instance easier tests in the treatment year – affect everyone in treatment and 
comparison schools, regardless of address. If there is something that increases achievement test 
scores for students in treatment enrollment zones – nine new community centers with a rigorous 
after school program, for example – our second identifying assumption is violated. 
  Under these assumptions, we can estimate the causal impact of enrolling in a treatment 
school.  Borrowing language from Angrist and Imbens (1994), the identified parameter is the Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) on “compliers,” or students induced to enrollment by virtue of 
living in a treatment school’s enrollment zone.  The parameter is estimated through a two-stage least 
squares regression of student outcomes on enrollment, with an indicator variable for living in a 
treatment zone as an instrumental variable for enrollment. 
  In what follows, we show the main results across all three empirical specifications. For clarity 
of exposition, however, we concentrate on our IV specification in the text unless otherwise noted. 
 
VI. Early Results from Middle and High Schools 
 
State Test Scores 
Tables 3 and 4 present a series of estimates of the impact of attending a treatment school on 
math and reading achievement, attendance, and college enrollment using the empirical models 
described above.  All test results are presented in standard deviation units. Standard errors, clustered 
at the school level, are in parentheses below each estimate.  
  Table 3 reports estimates of the impact of treatment on math and reading achievement as 
measured by TAKS. The rows specify how the results are pooled within the sample for a given set 
of regressions and each column coincides with a different empirical model that is being estimated. 
Recall, due to budget constraints, our fully loaded treatment that includes tutoring was only  
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implemented in sixth and ninth grade math. Reflecting this, we partition our middle school sample 
three ways. The first row estimates our empirical models on sixth graders only; the second presents 
results for seventh and eighth graders. The third row pools all middle school students. High school 
results are organized similarly. The final row in the table estimates the impact of the treatment on 
the full sample. In turn, columns (1) and (4) report results from linear regression columns (2) and (5) 
contain our difference-in-differences estimates, and columns (3) and (6) report the two-stage least 
squares estimates. 
The impact of instilling successful charter school practices in public schools on sixth grade 
math scores is large and statistically significant. Coefficients range from 0.301  (.071) in the linear 
model to 0.484  (.097) in the 2SLS specification. The impact on seventh and eighth grade math 
scores is significantly smaller [0.125  (.065)], but marginally significant. Pooling across grades yields 
a 0.237  (.066) effect. The qualitative results are similar across all empirical models, providing some 
confidence that the effects are robust to different specifications.  
High school math results follow a similar pattern, though an even more striking one given 
the size of the coefficients and the age of the students at the time of treatment. In ninth grade, 
where all students were given tutoring similar to that provided to sixth graders, treatment effects 
range from 0.376  (.088) to 0.726  (.099). In tenth and eleventh grade, there was a more modest 
0.165  (.084) increase. The pooled high school effect on math is 0.363  (.070) in the 2SLS 
specification. Pooling across both middle and high school students shows a treatment effect of 
0.277  (.053) in math for the first year of treatment. 
  Another, perhaps more transparent, way to look at the data is to perform an “event study” 
type analysis by graphing the distribution of average test score gains for each school-grade cell. We 
control for demographic observables by estimating equation (2) – our difference-in-differences 
estimator – but omitting the treatment indicator.  We then collect the residuals from this equation 
and average them to the school-grade level. The results echo those found in Table 3. In middle 
school math, twelve out of fifteen school-grade cells had positive gains. In high school math, nine 
out of twelve had positive gains. 
Let us put the magnitude of these estimates in perspective. Jacob and Ludwig (2008), in a 
survey of programs and policies designed to increase achievement among poor children, report that 
only three reforms pass a simple cost-benefit analysis: lowering class size, bonuses for teachers for 
teaching in hard-to-staff schools, and early childhood programs. The effect of lowering class size  
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from 24 to 16 students per teacher is approximately 0.22  (.05) on combined math and reading 
scores (Krueger 1999). The effect of Teach for America, one attempt to bring more skilled teachers 
into poor performing schools, is 0.15  in math and 0.03  in reading (Decker et al. 2004).  The effect 
of Head Start is 0.147  (.103) in applied problems and 0.319  (.147) in letter identification on the 
Woodcock-Johnson exam, but the effects on test scores fade in elementary school (Currie and 
Thomas 1995; Ludwig and Phillips 2007).  Fryer (2011b) finds that input-based student incentives 
also pass a cost-benefit analysis, with an effect size of approximately 0.15  in both math and reading 
depending on the nature of the incentives and the age of the student.   
All these effect sizes are a fraction of the impact of our fully-loaded treatment that includes 
tutoring. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) find effect sizes closest to our own, with students enrolled in 
oversubscribed Boston area charter middle schools gaining about 0.4  a year in math. Dobbie and 
Fryer (2011a) identify math treatment effects of 0.229  at the Harlem Childrens’ Zone Promise 
Academy Middle School. Angrist et al. (2010) estimate that students at a KIPP school in Lynn, MA 
gain 0.35  in math. 
Columns (4)-(6) in Table 3 present similar results for reading. Equally stunning, the impact 
of the five tenets on middle school reading scores is, if anything, negative, though the coefficients 
are small and only significant in our first two specifications. The opposite pattern holds for 
treatment high schools, which we estimate to have a 0.188   (.073) treatment effect in our 2SLS 
regression. Pooling across all grades, the impact of our intervention on reading achievement is 
0.062  (.054). Alternative specifications reveal a similar pattern. 
Figure 2, which performs the “event study” type analysis, supports the results of Table 3. 
High school reading shows positive impacts, though more muted than math. The opposite pattern 
emerges for middle school reading. 
The difference in achievement effects between math and reading, while striking, is consistent 
with previous work on the efficacy of charter schools and other educational interventions. 
Abdulkadirogluet al. (2011) and Angrist et al. (2010) find that the treatment effect of attending an 
oversubscribed charter school is four times as large for math as ELA. Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) 
demonstrate effects that are almost 5 times as large in middle school and 1.6 times as large in 
elementary school, in favor of math. In larger samples, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) reports an effect 
size 2.5 times as large in New York City charters, and Gleason et al. (2010) show that an average 
urban charter school increases math scores by .16  with statistically zero effect on reading.  
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There are many theories that may explain the disparity in treatment effects by subject area.
19 
Research in developmental psychology has suggested that the critical period for language 
development occurs early in life, while the critical period for developing higher cognitive functions 
extends into adolescence (Hopkins and Bracht 1975; Newport 1990; Pinker 1994; Nelson 2000; 
Knudsen et al. 2006). Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) show that students in the Promise Academy charter 
elementary school have large gains in ELA relative to students who begin in middle schools, 
suggesting that deficiencies in ELA might be addressed if intervention occurs relatively early in the 
child’s life. Another leading theory posits that reading scores are influenced by the language spoken 
when students are outside of the classroom (Charity et al. 2004; Rickford 1999).  Charity et al. (2004) 
argue that if students speak non-standard English at home and in their communities, increasing 
reading scores might be especially difficult. This theory could explain why students at an urban 
boarding school make similar progress on ELA and math (Curto and Fryer 2011).  
  An important limitation of our demonstration project is that we alter multiple school policies 
simultaneously. Thus, our estimates are of the impact of all investments; we cannot reliably parse out 
the effect of each. Due to budget constraints, we did not administer the high-dosage differentiation 
strategy in the same way to all students, which allows us to provide suggestive evidence on the most 
expensive component of the treatment. 
  While all sixth and ninth grade students received two-on-one math tutoring, students in 
other grades whose previous year test scores were below grade level were enrolled in a second math 
or reading class (hereafter “double-dosing”).  Hence, we can measure the effectiveness of different 
treatment components by examining how treatment effects vary across different segments of the 
sample. A simple specification that accomplishes this is a triple difference estimator of the form: 
(4)         ∆                                                                       
                 
 
Componenti is an indicator for receiving a given component of the treatment that was not received by 
everyone in the treatment population (either tutoring or double-dosing);    is the marginal 
contribution of that component and our parameter of interest.  
                                                 
19 It is important to remember that our largest treatment effects were in grades with two-on-one tutoring in math – it is 
worth considering whether similar interventions for reading could have a sizeable impact on reading outcomes.  
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   For our “double dosing” estimates, we use the within-grade population for our comparison 
group.
20  In essence, we estimate a difference-in-differences statistic on students below the test 
cutoff, and subtract out a second difference-in-differences statistic estimated on students above the 
cut-off.
21  Thus, if    is positive and significant, this implies that students in the double dosing 
courses gained more in the treatment year than students that did not have the extra dose. An 
important limitation of this approach is that it cannot account for potentially important 
unobservable differences between students who receive an extra math or reading class and those 
who do not (e.g. motivation).  
The results from this suggestive exercise are presented in Panel A of Appendix Table 3.  In 
eighth grade math we show a positive and statistically significant effect of 0.235 .  This is an 
anamoly relative to the other subject-grade pairs. All other results are small and statistically 
insignificant.  Pooling across all four grades, the estimated effects are 0.067  in math and -0.016   in 
reading. 
  Since there is no within-grade variation in who receives math tutoring, we estimate equation 
(4) for two different comparison populations.  First, we compare math effects among the tutored 
populations to effects among the untutored population in subsequent grades.  That is, we compare 
sixth (ninth) grade improvement in math to seventh and eighth (tenth and eleventh) grade 
improvements.  As one would expect given the results already presented, the effects of tutoring are 
positive and quite large: 0.297  in sixth grade, 0.395  in ninth grade.
22   
 
College Enrollment 
  Seniors in treatment high schools received significant support and encouragement 
throughout the college application process.  In addition to visible demonstrations of a college-going 
culture, treatment schools required all seniors to apply to a two or four year institution; offering 
support through guidance counselors, aggressive financial aid assistance, college nights, college 
centers, and so on. As a result, 95 percent of seniors were accepted to a two-year college and 48 
percent were accepted to a four year college or university. 
                                                 
20 We also experimented with including only a subset of students who scored within various bands around the cutoff 
point.  The resulting estimates were substantively similar to those in Appendix Table 7, but much less precise.  
21 Given the sharp cutoff, a regression discontinuity design would normally be our preferred identification strategy.  
However, the distribution of scores is not sufficiently dense around the critical point to generate reliable estimates. 
22 We also compare sixth grade math trajectories to sixth grade reading trajectories (and similarly for ninth grade).  These 
estimates (0.409  and 0.499 ) are even larger, though the implicit assumption is that tutoring in reading would be just as 
effective which is likely invalid.  
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Using data from the National Student Clearinghouse, we estimate the impact of treatment 
on two college outcomes: whether a student enrolled in any college (extensive margin) and whether 
they chose a four-year college, conditional on enrolling in any college (intensive margin). These 
effects are estimated with probit model that uses our full set of demographic variables and baseline 
test scores as controls.  
The results are displayed in Table 4.  Calculated at the mean, the point estimate of marginal 
increase in the probability of attending college is -6.2 percentage points, though the effect is not 
statistically significant.  Conditional on attending college, however, treatment students are more 
likely – 17.7 percentage points – to enroll in a four-year institution. Relative to a mean of 46% in 
comparison schools, this is a roughly 40% increase. 
 
Attendance 
  We next consider the effects of treatment on attendance rates, using our difference-in-
differences and instrumental variable methods. Taken together, the treatment effect estimates are all 
positive, but small and at most marginally significant.  Middle school estimates do not depend 
heavily on whether we use our zoning instrument; the DD specification yields an effect of 0.359 
percentage points (0.196), whereas the 2SLS estimate is 0.377 percentage points (0.265).  In high 
school, however, the estimates diverge, suggesting selection might be an important issue.  The DD 
estimate is 0.144 (0.323), compared to 1.186 (0.663). 
  
VII. Robustness Checks 
  We have shown that increasing time on task, changing the human capital in the school, 
providing two-on-one tutoring or computers to differentiate instruction, using data to guide 
instructional practice, and having high expectations for students can generate large gains in math and 
small to no gains in reading. In this section, we explore the extent to which these results are robust 
to a falsification test, alternative specifications, alternative constructions of comparison schools, 
alternative achievement scores, attrition, and cheating. In all cases, our main results are unchanged. 
 
A Falsification Test 
Following the logic of Rothstein (2010), we perform a partial falsification test by estimating 
the impact of attending our treatment schools in the pre-treatment year. We estimate the OLS and 
DID specifications described by equations (1) and (2), during the 2008-09 school year – two years  
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before the intervention began.
23  If our identification assumptions are valid, we would expect these 
estimates to be statistically zero. Unfortunately, the reverse is not necessarily true. If the estimates 
are statistically zero, our research design may still be invalid. 
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the high level results of this exercise; Appendix Table 5 
provides further detail. The difference-in-difference estimates for sixth and ninth grade math, where 
we find our largest estimates, are -.138   (0.088) and .041  (.050), respectively. Of the 26 estimates 
detailed in Appendix Table 5, only one (the OLS estimate of the 6
th grade reading effect) is 
statistically differentiable from zero at a 90% confidence level. 
 
Alternative Specifications 
In our second robustness check, we outline and implement a procedure to examine the 
robustness of our estimates under a large set of feasible model specifications. Consider a general 
class of linear models described by the following equation: 
(5)    t g s i g i s t s t i t g s i X treatment score Avg score score , , , 1 , 1 , , , , _                       
where Avg_scores,t-1 denotes the average test score at the school attended by student i during the pre-
treatment year. Note that if we set θ =0, equation (5) and equation (1) – our OLS specification – are 
identical.  If we additionally force γ to equal 1, we recover the difference-in-differences specification 
of equation (2); hence both equations (1) and (2) are special cases of equation (5). Additionally, if we 
allow θ to be flexible and restrict γ =0, we have the specification recommended in Rothstein (2009). 
Let γ   denote the OLS estimate of γ when we force θ to zero, and call θ   the estimated value 
for θ when γ =0.  Then the set of feasible values for γ and θ is a rectangle in γ-θ space described by  
 0,θ       γ  ,1 .  Each (γ,θ) pair in this set can be thought of a feasible restriction to equation (5), and 
OLS estimation under each restriction will yield a new estimate of τ, our treatment effect.   
A simple way to vizualize the results of this exercise is to graph the results in γ-θ-τ space.  If 
our estimates of τ are robust to all feasible specifications – that is, if τ remains constant as we vary γ 
and θ – the figures would be flat and parallel to the γ-θ plane.   
Appendix Figures 4A and 4B graph the results of this procedure, with τ on the z-axis.  On 
each plot we have labeled the corners that correspond to the OLS specification used in our main 
results, our difference-in-differences specification, and a third specification that controls for school-
                                                 
23 Zoning information from this period is unavailable to us, so we cannot include our instrumental variable method.  
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average scores instead of individual scores. In most cases the graphs are relatively flat, and the 
difference-in-differences estimates are quite close to the alternate OLS specification using school-
average scores. The graphs provide evidence that our results are robust to alternative model 
specifications. 
 
Alternative Definitions of “Comparison” Schools 
Our third robustness check estimates the impact of treatment using 3 additional definitions 
of comparison schools. Recall, the Texas Education Agency provides a list of comparison schools 
for every school in the state of Texas for accountability purposes for which we gleaned 34 
comparison schools (all schools that were in Houston). We construct 3 alternative sets of 
comparison schools: (1) nine schools that HISD officials considered to be the best matches for 
treatment schools (deemed “Matched Schools”); (2) All HISD schools rated “Academically 
Acceptable” (the accountability level just above our treatment schools); and (3) all schools in HISD. 
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the estimate that deviates the most from our main specification 
across the three alternative definitions of comparisons schools described above. For both math and 
reading, our estimates are extremely similar across all comparison populations. Appendix Tables 6 
and 7 present two-stage-least-squares estimates of all treatment effect across these comparison 
samples.  Our results are generally robust to different constructions of comparison groups.   
 
Alternative “Low Stakes” Test Scores 
Although the results for both middle and high school samples provide some optimism about 
the potential for a set of school based investments to increase achievement among poor students, 
one might worry that improvements on state exams may be driven by test-specific preparatory 
activities at the expense of more general learning. Jacob (2005), for example, finds evidence that the 
introduction of accountability programs increases high-stakes test scores without increasing scores 
on low-stakes tests, most likely through increases in test-specific skills and student effort. It is 
important to know whether the results presented above are being driven by actual gains in general 
knowledge or whether the improvements are only relevant to the high-stakes state exams. 
To provide some evidence on this question, we present data from the Stanford 10 that is 
administered annually to all students in Houston in kindergarten through eleventh grade. Houston is 
one of a handful of cities that voluntary administer a nationally normed test that teachers and 
principals are not held accountable for – decreasing the incentive to teach to the test or engage in  
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other forms of manipulation. The math and reading tests are aligned with standards set by the 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and the National Council of Teachers of Reading, 
respectively.
24  
Column 3 of Table 5 presents estimates of our experiment on Stanford 10 math and reading 
scores.
25 As in our state test results, there are large and statistically significant effects on sixth and 
ninth grade math, where students received high-dosage tutoring. The coefficient is 0.217  (.085) for 
sixth graders and 0.407  (.095) for ninth graders – roughly half of the estimated treatment effect on 
state test scores. Scores for seventh and eighth graders are positive but not statistically significant. 
Conversely, reading scores for middle school students are negative and statistically significant in 
sixth grade and statistically insignificant in other grades. High schools demonstrate a substantially 
different pattern – an overall increase of 0.160  (.039). Pooling all students together yields a 0.133  
(.057) treatment effect in math and a 0.023 (.038) treatment effect in reading. 
 
Attrition 
The estimates thus far use the sample of students who enrolled in a treatment or comparison 
school at the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, and for whom we have test scores in the 
spring of 2011. Our DID specification also requires a pre-treatment test score so we can estimate 
trends in student achievement. If treatment and comparison schools have different rates of selection 
into this sample, our results may be biased.  Removing 310 teachers and nine principals was not a 
“quiet” process. It is plausible that parents were aware of the major changes and opted to move their 
students to another school within HISD, a private school, or a well-known charter like KIPP or 
YES. In the latter two cases, the student’s test scores will be missing. Our IV strategy does not 
account for selective attrition. 
A simple test for this type of selection bias is to investigate the impact of treatment school 
on the probability of entering our analysis sample. As Appendix Table 9 shows, students in the 
treatment group are 0.6 percent more likely to be missing 2011 test scores, though these estimates 
are not statistically significant.  It is slightly more troubling to note that treatment students are 3.8 
percent and 4.0 percent more likely to be missing baseline math and reading scores, respectively.  
                                                 
24Math tests include content testing number sense, pattern recognition, algebra, geometry, and probability and statistics, 
depending on the grade level. Reading tests include age-appropriate questions measuring reading ability, vocabulary, and 
comprehension. More information can be found at http://www.pearsonassessments.com/HAIWEB/Cultures/en-
us/Productdetail.htm?Pid=SAT10C. 
25 Appendix Table 8 provides OLS and DID estimates as well.  
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This omission could threaten our DID identification if this type of attrition is non-random. 




  A “sixth” dimension of the experiment, hitherto ignored, is the amount of pressure and 
attention HISD put on the treatment schools. The HISD Superintendent, Dr. Terry Grier, set goals 
for each principal for the year. It was made abundantly clear that there were financial rewards for 
those who were successful at meeting these goals and termination of employment for those who 
were not. This is not unlike the environment of certain performance-driven charter schools.  
  In school districts in a variety of locales a relationship has emerged between some forms of 
accountability and the prevalence of cheating on state tests (Jacob 2005). Therefore, using an 
algorithm developed by Jacob and Levitt (2003), we implement four statistical tests of cheating in all 
Houston middle and high schools. All of the metrics are designed to detect suspicious patterns in 
student answers that could result from a teacher or administrator correcting responses for some set 
of students. First, we search for unusual blocks of consecutive identical answers given by multiple 
test-takers. Second, we look for unlikely correlation in answer responses within classrooms. Third, 
we examine whether these correlations exhibit an unusually high variance in certain schools and 
grades. Fourth, we measure whether students achieve a given score through an unusual combination 
of correct answers.
26 We then rank each school-grade combination on each of these metrics and 
create an aggregate ranking based on all four metrics.   
  Appendix Figure 5 displays the estimated densities of the aggregate score. Grade-school 
combinations showing relatively high levels of suspicion are in the extreme left tails of each 
distribution.  A quick inspection shows that treatment school-grade combinations are clustered in 
the middle of each distribution.  The one marginally suspicious point on the left tail of the math 
distribution is ranked 18 out of 370 grade-school combinations and is the only treatment grade to 
appear in the top 5 percent in either subject. The average treatment grade ranks 162.3 on the math 
metrics and 159.5 in reading, which puts them at the 43.9 and 43.1 percentile of the distribution, 
respectively. 
  It is important to note that this does not rule out the possibility of cheating. Indeed, as Jacob 
and Levitt (2003) make clear, this algorithm only identifies unsophisticated cheaters.  
                                                 





This paper examines the impact of injecting the practices from successful charter schools 
into nine traditional public schools in Houston during the 2010-2011 school year.  The five tenets 
implemented in the treatment schools were an increase in instructional time, a change in the human 
capital in the school, high-dosage differentiation through two-on-one tutoring or computerized 
instruction, data-driven instruction, and a school culture of high expectations for all students 
regardless of background or past performance. We have shown that this particular set of 
interventions can generate large gains in math, modest gains in high school reading, and no effect (if 
anything, negative) in middle school reading.  
  As mentioned in the introduction, 48% of schools in America failed the standards set out in 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. These results provide the first proof point that charter 
school practices can be used systematically in previously failing traditional public schools to 
significantly increase student achievement in ways similar to the most successful charter schools.  
Many questions remain after these initial results.  Perhaps the most important open question is the 
extent to which these efforts might eventually be scalable.  
We conclude with a speculative discussion about the scalability of our experiment along four 
dimensions: local politics, financial resources, fidelity of implementation, and labor supply of human 
capital. Unfortunately, our discussion offers few, if any, definitive answers.  
We begin with local politics. It is possible that Houston is an exception and the experiment 
is not scalable because Texas is one of only twenty-two “right to work” states and has been on the 
cutting edge of many education reforms including early forms of accountability, standardized testing, 
and the charter school movement.  Houston has a remarkably innovative and research-driven 
Superintendent at the twilight of his career who is keen on trying bold initiatives and a supportive 
school board who voted 9-0 to begin the initiative in middle and high schools and, in more typical 
fashion, voted 5-4 to expand it to elementary schools. Arguing against the uniqueness of Houston is 
the fact that we recently began a virtually identical experiment in Denver, Colorado – a city with a 
strong teacher’s union.  
The financial resources needed for our experiment is another potential limiting factor to 
scalability. The marginal costs are $1,837 per student, which is similar to the marginal costs of other 
high-performing charter schools. While this may seem to be an important barrier, a back of the 
envelope cost-benefit exercise reveals that the rate of return on this investment is roughly 20 percent  
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– if one takes the point estimates at face value.
27 Moreover, there are likely lower cost ways to 
conduct our experiment. For instance, tutoring cost over $2,500 per student. Future experiments can 
inform whether three-on-one (reducing costs by a third) or even online tutoring may yield similar 
effects. On the other hand, marshaling these types of resources for already cash strapped districts 
may be an important limiting factor. 
Fidelity of implementation was a constant challenge. In large school districts, bureaucracy 
can lead to complacency. For instance, rather than give every tutor applicant a math test and a mock 
interview, one can save a lot of time (and potentially compromise quality) by selecting by other 
means (e.g. recommendation letters). Many programs that have shown significant initial impacts 
have struggled to scale because of breakdowns in site based implementation (Schochet et al. 2008).  
Perhaps the most worrisome hurdle of implementation is the labor supply of talent available 
to teach in inner-city schools. Most all our principals and many of our teachers were successful 
leaders at previous schools. It took over two hundred principal interviews to find nine individuals 
who possessed the values and beliefs consistent with the leaders in successful charter schools and a 
demonstrated record of achievement. Successful charter schools report similar difficulties, often 
arguing that talent is the limiting factor of growth (Tucker and Codding 2002). All of the principals 
and two-thirds of the teachers were recruited from other schools. If the education production 
function has strong diminishing returns in human capital, then reallocating teachers and principals 
can increase total production. If, however, the production function has weakly increasing returns, 
then reallocating talent may decrease total production of achievement. In this case, developing ways 
to increase the human capital available to teach students through changes in pay, the use of 
technology, reimagining the role of schools of education, or lowering the barriers to entry into the 
teaching profession may be a necessary component of scalability. 
*** 
This paper takes first steps to demonstrate that the lessons learned from achievement-
increasing charter schools can be injected into traditional public schools. While we have shown that 
the barriers to implementing charter school best practices in traditional public schools – politics, 
school boards, collective bargaining, local community leaders, selective attrition – are surmountable, 
our results may open more questions than they answer. Can we develop a model to increase middle 
school reading achievement? Is there an equally effective, but lower cost, way of tutoring students? 
Are all the tenets necessary or can we simply provide tutoring with the current stock of human 
                                                 
27 The details of this calculation are in Appendix D.  
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capital? A key issue moving forward is to experiment with variations on the five tenets – and others 
– to further develop a school reform model that may, eventually, increase achievement and close the 
racial achievement gap in education.  
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Figure 1: Evidence of Treatment Figure 2: Distribution of Average Gains for Each School-Grade Cell 
Notes:  Markers represent treatment cells. Table 1: Summary of Treatment
Human Capital -100% of principals replaced
-52% of teachers replaced
More Time on Task -School year extended by ﬁve days
-Five hours added to average school week
-School year extended by 10 days relative to previous year
-Total instructional time increased by 21% over previous year
High-Dosage Tutoring -257 Tutors hired to support sixth and ninth grade math instruction
-Students meet with tutor daily in groups of two
-In non-tutored grades, students who are behind grade level in either
math or reading take a supplemental computer-driven course in that
subject
-Middle school students received roughly 215 hours of tutoring /
double-dosing, compared to 189 hours for high schoolers
Culture of High Expectations -First week of school devoted to “culture camp” to foster behaviors /
attitudes conducive to academic success
-Every classroom required to post goals for the year
-Every student must know individual goals for the year and plan for
achieving them
-Every school required to display visual evidence of a college-going
culture
-94.7% of high school students accepted to two- or four-year college
Data-Driven Instruction -In addition to regular HISD interim assessments, treatment schools
administered two or three comprehensive benchmark assessments
in each of four subjects (frequency varied according to subject and
grade
-After each assessment, teachers received student-level data
from these assessments and used the information to guide one-on-one
goal-setting conversations with studentsTable 2: Summary Statistics
Treatment Comparison p-val All Non-Treatment p-val
Panel A: Student-Level Variables
Female 0.462 0.480 0.072 0.491 0.010
White 0.020 0.018 0.834 0.090 0.000
Black 0.430 0.296 0.190 0.263 0.053
Hispanic 0.503 0.666 0.075 0.600 0.255
Asian 0.030 0.009 0.095 0.033 0.721
Economically Disadvantaged 0.614 0.632 0.804 0.491 0.237
Limited English Proﬁciency 0.216 0.173 0.343 0.147 0.051
Special Education 0.172 0.133 0.080 0.103 0.004
Gifted and Talented 0.037 0.078 0.002 0.163 0.000
Pre-Treatment Scores
Math Score (TAKS) -0.374 -0.151 0.000 0.033 0.000
Reading Score (TAKS) -0.358 -0.208 0.001 0.032 0.000
Math Score (Stanford) -0.438 -0.189 0.001 0.109 0.000
Reading Score (Stanford) -0.479 -0.235 0.000 0.106 0.000
Missing TAKS Math 0.210 0.146 0.004 0.136 0.000
Missing TAKS Reading 0.211 0.148 0.003 0.137 0.000
Post-Treatment Scores
Math Score (TAKS) -0.178 -0.165 0.878 0.016 0.027
Reading Score (TAKS) -0.335 -0.208 0.002 0.029 0.000
Math Score (Stanford) -0.371 -0.212 0.015 0.033 0.000
Reading Score (Stanford) -0.465 -0.252 0.000 0.042 0.000
Enrolled in Any College 0.370 0.445 0.124 — —
Enrolled in 4-Year College 0.234 0.205 0.375 — —
Observations 8694 34555 74210
Panel B: Pre-Treatment School-Level Variables
Teacher Characteristics
Average Experience (years) 9.854 11.169 0.197 11.761 0.046
Average Math Value-Added -0.294 0.357 0.136 0.450 0.064
Average Reading Value-Added 0.125 0.431 0.457 0.326 0.597
Student Body Characteristics
Suspensions per Student 1.117 1.299 0.567 0.984 0.650
Four-Year Graduation Rate (HS Only) 0.385 0.531 0.001 0.605 0.000
Attendance Rate 0.913 0.929 0.080 0.933 0.024
Observations 9 34 96
Notes: This table reports student-level and school-level summary statistics for the nine treatment schools (Column 1), any of the
34 schools designated as a comparison school by the Texas Education Agency (Column 2), and all non-treatment schools in the
Houston Independent School District (Column 4). All statistics are based on 2009-2010 enrollment, except for variables labeled as
post-treatment. School-level variables are weighted according to the the number of students enrolled. Columns (3) and (5) report
p-values resulting from of test of equal means in the Apollo and Comparison groups or the Apollo and HISD groups, respectively.Table 3: The Effect of Treatment on State Test Scores
TAKS Math TAKS Reading
OLS DID 2SLS OLS DID 2SLS
Grade 6 0.301*** 0.408*** 0.484*** -0.073 0.016 0.113
(0.071) (0.069) (0.097) (0.044) (0.045) (0.072)
5765 4932 4901 5731 4894 4863
Grades 7 & 8 0.014 0.120** 0.125* -0.063** -0.036 -0.067
(0.038) (0.049) (0.065) (0.030) (0.041) (0.057)
11606 10134 10076 11562 10090 10034
All Middle School 0.106** 0.211*** 0.237*** -0.065** -0.019 -0.008
(0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.030) (0.028) (0.047)
17371 15066 14977 17293 14984 14897
Grade 9 0.376*** 0.490*** 0.726*** -0.044 0.045 0.116
(0.088) (0.095) (0.099) (0.062) (0.061) (0.097)
4273 3357 3328 4356 3433 3343
Grades 10 & 11 0.147* 0.102 0.165* 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.215***
(0.071) (0.068) (0.084) (0.037) (0.025) (0.068)
7118 6097 6050 7271 6226 6100
All High School 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.363*** 0.073* 0.107*** 0.188**
(0.075) (0.068) (0.070) (0.039) (0.027) (0.073)
11391 9454 9378 11627 9659 9443
Pooled Sample 0.166*** 0.225*** 0.277*** -0.006 0.039 0.062
(0.048) (0.040) (0.054) (0.032) (0.033) (0.054)
28762 24520 24355 28920 24643 24340
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effects of attending a treatment school on Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills
(TAKS) scores. Estimates follow the three speciﬁcations described in the text: controlled OLS regression, difference-in-differences
(DID), and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) DID estimator. All speciﬁcations adjust for the student-level demographic variables
summarized in Table 2, as well as the student’s age and grade. OLS estimates also include previous year’s test scores as covariates.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and
99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.Table 4: The Effect of Treatment on
College Enrollment and Attendance
College Enrollment Attendance Rate
Extensive Intensive DID 2SLS
Margin Margin
Middle School 0.359* 0.377
— — (0.196) (0.265)
11467 11365
High School -0.062 0.177*** 0.144 1.186*
(0.038) (0.045) (0.323) (0.663)
3675 1582 11858 11428
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effects of attending a treatment school on college enrollment and attendance rates. All
speciﬁcations adjust for the student-level demographic variables summarized in Table 2, as well as the student’s age, grade, and
baseline test scores. Effects on attendance rates are reported in units of percentage points. We consider the extensive margin of
college enrollment the probability of enrolling in any college, and the the intensive margin the increase in probability of enrolling
in a four-year college, conditional on enrolling in some college. We estimate probit regressions for these outcomes and report
marginal effects, calculated at the mean. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. *, **, and ***




Grade 6 -0.138 0.392*** 0.217**
(0.088) (0.089) (0.085)
5383 1359 5289
All Middle School -0.071 0.291*** 0.100
(.063) (0.080) (0.068)
15853 7349 16214
Grade 9 0.041 0.581*** 0.407***
(0.050) (0.142) (0.095)
3906 4715 3668
All High School -0.008 0.194 0.166***
(0.028) (0.120) (0.061)
10052 13907 10084




Grade 6 0.083 0.151 -0.110*
(0.057) (0.103) (0.061)
5362 1343 5289
All Middle School 0.011 0.054 -0.051
(0.028) (0.066) (0.036)
15894 4456 16253
Grade 9 0.011 -0.135 0.145**
(0.061) (0.200) (0.072)
4023 9814 3641
All High School 0.012 0.013 0.160***
(0.025) (0.115) (0.039)
10296 27290 10017
Pooled Sample 0.012 0.011 0.023
(0.019) (0.053) (0.038)
26190 56571 26270
Notes: This table summarizes the results of three robustness checks. Column(1) reports “treatment effects” estimated using data
from a pre-treatment year. Column (2) considers three different methods of constructing a comparison group and reports the point
estimate that diverges most from our main speciﬁcation. Column (3) uses a nationally normed, low-stakes test as a dependent
variable instead of the state test used in our main results. All estimates use the difference-in-differences speciﬁcation described in
the notes of Table 3. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance








































































































































































































































































































































 Notes: Graphs display the average fifth grade TAKS scores for incoming classes in treatment schools, comparison schools, and the rest of HISD, 
between the 2007-08 and 2009-10 school years. Scores are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
Appendix Figure 3A: Potential Selection Effects in Sixth Grade Notes: Graphs display the average eighth grade TAKS scores for incoming classes in treatment schools, comparison schools, and the rest of HISD, 
between the 2007-08 and 2009-10 school years. Scores are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
Appendix Figure 3B: Potential Selection Effects in Ninth Grade Appendix Figure 4A: Alternative Model Specifications (Math) 
6th Grade  7th and 8th Grade 
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 Appendix Table 1: The Correlation Between Non-Traditional (i.e. “Within the School”)
Inputs and Charter School Effectiveness In New York
Panel A: Math Results (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher Feedback 0:075
(0:021)










R2 0.199 0.196 0.090 0.262 0.169 0.470
Observations 35 20 35 35 35 35
Panel B: ELA Results (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Teacher Feedback 0:054
(0:017)










R2 0.262 0.200 0.287 0.201 0.250 0.498
Observations 35 20 35 35 35 35
Notes: Source: Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment effects on
school characteristics. The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey
administered by Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). Teacher Feedback indicates whether teachers receive formal or informal
feedback ten or more times per semester. Schools are considered to use Data-Driven Instruction if they administer two
or more interim assessments each semester and have four or more uses for assessments. Schools with High Dosage
Tutoring offer small-group tutoring at least four times per week in groups of no more than six students. Instructional
Time is an indicator set equal to one if a school has at least 25% more instructional hours in a given school year than a
traditional New York City public school. We deﬁne a school that maintains High Expectations as one whose principal
listed “a relentless focus on academic goals and having students meet them” and “Very high expectations for student
behavior and discipline” as his/her top two priorities from a list of ten options. Regressions weight by the inverse of
the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent
level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.Appendix Table 2: First-Stage Results
Zone
Coefﬁcient F-stat
Grade 6 0.691*** 31.484***
(0.123) 0.000
Grades 7 & 8 0.690*** 42.078***
(0.106) 0.000
All Middle School 0.690*** 39.649***
(0.110) 0.000
Grade 9 0.569*** 20.416***
(0.126) 0.000
Grades 10 & 11 0.597*** 21.964***
(0.127) 0.000
All High School 0.587*** 22.110***
(0.125) 0.000
Pooled Sample 0.654*** 58.807***
(0.085) 0.000
This table summarizes the results of the ﬁrst stage of our instrumental variable speciﬁcation, in which we regress
treatment on a dummy for living in a treatment-school zone, a third-degree polynomial of the distance to the nearest
treatment school, and our the full set of covariates. Column 1 reports the coefﬁcient on the zone dummy and it’s asso-
ciated standard error, with clustering at the school level. Column 2 reports the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic and its associated
p-value. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.Appendix Table 3: Triple-Difference Estimates of Double-Dosing and Tutoring Effectiveness
Grade Grade Grade Grade Grade Grade
6 7 8 9 10 11 Pooled
Panel A: Double Dosing
Math -0.046 0.220*** -0.006 0.056 0.067
— (0.058) (0.062) — (0.103) (0.061) (0.049)
4967 4984 3198 2758 15907
Reading -0.079 -0.010 -0.036 -0.051 -0.016
— (0.058) (0.076) — (0.041) (0.049) (0.032)
4940 4980 3255 2810 15985
Panel B: Tutoring
Math: Higher Grades Comparison 0.297*** 0.395*** 0.342***
(0.067) — — (0.077) — — (0.051)
15062 9454 24516
Math: Reading Comparison 0.409*** 0.499*** 0.459***
(0.070) — — (0.092) — — (0.058)
4932 3356 8288
Notes: This table presents triple-difference estimates of the effects of double-dosing and tutoring on TAKS scores. For double-
dosing, the table reports the difference between DID estimates for students who received double-dosing and those in the same grade
who did not. For tutoring, the table reports differences between both (a) sixth (ninth) grade math estimates math estimates from
the two subsequent grades and (b) sixth (ninth) grade math estimates and same-grade reading estimates. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels,
respectively.Appendix Table 6: The Impact Treatment on TAKS Scores Within Various Subgroups
Whole Race Econ. Disadv. Baseline Test Quartile
Sample Black Hispanic p-val Yes No p-val Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 p-val
Panel A: Math
Grade 6 0.408*** 0.347*** 0.454*** 0.409*** 0.405** 0.340*** 0.381*** 0.367*** 0.087
(0.069) (0.058) (0.079) 0.118 (0.065) (0.176) 0.974 (0.049) (0.083) (0.095) (0.137) 0.014
4932 1252 3531 4616 316 1377 1468 1400 687
Grades 7 & 8 0.120** 0.031 0.190*** 0.095* 0.177*** 0.018 0.090 0.028 0.104
(0.049) (0.068) (0.036) 0.000 (0.052) (0.050) 0.017 (0.037) (0.054) (0.075) (0.063) 0.017
10134 2742 7077 6691 3427 2717 3068 2527 1822
Grade 9 0.490*** 0.363*** 0.535*** 0.397*** 0.563*** 0.315** 0.482*** 0.589*** 0.688***
(0.095) (0.117) (0.086) 0.053 (0.108) (0.082) 0.002 (0.116) (0.079) (0.089) (0.161) 0.007
3357 976 2291 1368 1988 1086 1092 757 422
Grades 10 & 11 0.102 -0.053 0.180*** 0.092 0.109 0.122* 0.116 0.143 0.166**
(0.068) (0.051) (0.051) 0.000 (0.062) (0.072) 0.452 (0.070) (0.092) (0.084) (0.063) 0.829
6097 1931 3996 2056 4031 1459 1906 1684 1048
Panel B: Reading
Grade 6 0.016 0.039 -0.013 0.011 0.102 0.000 -0.086* -0.023 -0.175***
(0.045) (0.055) (0.071) 0.565 (0.047) (0.109) 0.392 (0.039) (0.043) (0.104) (0.061) 0.000
4894 1241 3506 4580 314 1446 1519 1219 710
Grades 7 & 8 -0.036 0.021 -0.076* 0.018 -0.146*** -0.038 -0.076** -0.073 0.023
(0.041) (0.037) (0.043) 0.000 (0.046) (0.045) 0.001 (0.055) (0.033) (0.053) (0.084) 0.478
10090 2738 7038 6668 3406 2978 3098 2675 1339
Grade 9 0.045 0.076 0.007 0.082 0.011 0.103* 0.015 -0.098** -0.095
(0.061) (0.082) (0.067) 0.301 (0.088) (0.052) 0.302 (0.058) (0.083) (0.046) (0.244) 0.011
3433 1015 2325 1416 2014 1344 1071 780 238
Grades 10 & 11 0.140*** 0.106*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.132*** 0.105*** 0.172*** 0.144** 0.092
(0.025) (0.033) (0.026) 0.217 (0.037) (0.024) 0.568 (0.030) (0.032) (0.058) (0.076) 0.011
6226 1962 4084 2108 4108 1799 2169 1328 930
Notes: This table reports treatment effects on TAKS math and reading tests for various subgroups in the data. All estimates use the difference-in-difference estimator
described in the notes of previous tables. Columns (5), (8), and (13) report p-values resulting from a test of equal coefﬁcients between the race, economic, and testing
groups, respectively. Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence
levels, respectively.Appendix Table 3: The Effect of Attending Treatment
Schools in a Pre-Treatment Year
Math Reading
OLS DID OLS DID
Grade 6 -0.110 -0.138 0.101* 0.083
(0.086) (0.088) (0.053) (0.057)
6171 5383 6132 5362
Grades 7 & 8 -0.035 -0.020 -0.039 -0.017
(0.059) (0.056) (0.031) (0.023)
11996 10470 12087 10532
All Middle School -0.058 -0.071 0.007 0.011
(0.060) (0.063) (0.029) (0.028)
18167 15853 18219 15894
Grade 9 0.077 0.041 0.050 0.011
(0.049) (0.050) (0.055) (0.061)
4743 3906 4905 4023
Grades 10 & 11 -0.002 -0.045 0.042 0.011
(0.032) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035)
7007 6146 7149 6273
All High School 0.029 -0.008 0.044 0.012
(0.029) (0.028) (0.035) (0.025)
11750 10052 12054 10296
Pooled Sample -0.017 -0.031 0.019 0.012
(0.040) (0.040) (0.021) (0.019)
29917 25905 30273 26190
Notes: This table reproduces OLS and DID estimates of treatment effects for the 2008-09 school year (during which no schools
received treatment). All speciﬁcations adjust for the student-level demographic variables summarized in Table 2, as well as the stu-
dent’s age and grade. OLS estimates also include previous year’s test scores as covariates. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.Appendix Table 6: TAKS Math Estimates By Sample
Comparison Matched Acceptable All
Schools Schools Schools HISD
Grade 6 0.484*** 0.392*** 0.475*** 0.572***
(0.097) (0.089) (0.089) (0.102)
4901 1359 2389 9845
Middle School 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.291*** 0.262***
(0.066) (0.061) (0.080) (0.063)
14977 4486 7349 29384
Grade 9 0.728*** 0.750*** 0.581*** 0.717***
(0.099) (0.094) (0.142) (0.156)
3329 1487 4715 9781
High School 0.360*** 0.359*** 0.194 0.227*
(0.069) (0.082) (0.120) (0.124)
9384 4060 13907 27259
Pooled Sample 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.249*** 0.247***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.067) (0.059)
24361 8546 21256 56643
This table presents estimates of the effects of attending a treatment school on Texas Assessment of Knowledge and
Skills Math scores across three different sample speciﬁcations. All estimates use our two-stage least squares estimator
and control for the covariates described in the notes of Table 3. Column (1) includes all schools that the Texas
Education Agency considers a comparison school for one or more treatment schools. Column (2) restricts the sample
to the nine schools that HISD ofﬁcials consider the best match for each treatment school. Column (3) uses all HISD
middle and high schools rated Unacceptable or Acceptable based on their performance during the 2009-10 schoolyear.
Column (4) includes every middle and high school in HISD. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at
the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.Appendix Table 7: TAKS Reading Estimates by Sample
Comparison Matched Acceptable All
Schools Schools Schools HISD
Grade 6 0.114 0.151 0.106** 0.037
(0.072) (0.103) (0.054) (0.070)
4862 1343 2368 9797
Middle School -0.005 0.054 0.010 -0.030
(0.046) (0.066) (0.053) (0.042)
14896 4456 7309 29281
Grade 9 0.118 0.118 -0.115 -0.135
(0.097) (0.083) (0.164) (0.200)
3340 1493 4764 9814
High School 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.023 0.013
(0.073) (0.065) (0.097) (0.115)
9434 4080 13953 27290
Pooled Sample 0.066 0.111** 0.014 0.011
(0.053) (0.054) (0.058) (0.053)
24330 8536 21262 56571
This table presents estimates of the effects of attending a treatment school on Texas Assessment of Knowledge and
Skills Reading scores across three different sample speciﬁcations. All estimates use our two-stage least squares esti-
mator and control for the covariates described in the notes of Table 3. Column (1) includes all schools that the Texas
Education Agency considers a comparison school for one or more treatment schools. Column (2) restricts the sample
to the nine schools that HISD ofﬁcials consider the best match for each treatment school. Column (3) uses all HISD
middle and high schools rated Unacceptable or Acceptable based on their performance during the 2009-10 schoolyear.
Column (4) includes every middle and high school in HISD. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at
the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.Appendix Table 8: The Effect of Treatment on Stanford 10 Scores
Math Reading
OLS DID 2SLS OLS DID 2SLS
Grade 6 0.088** 0.196*** 0.217** -0.184*** -0.117*** -0.110*
(0.042) (0.054) (0.085) (0.026) (0.032) (0.061)
6184 5309 5289 6182 5308 5289
Grades 7 & 8 -0.027 0.083 0.044 -0.031 0.030 -0.020
(0.038) (0.060) (0.073) (0.021) (0.026) (0.039)
12652 10966 10925 12698 11007 10964
All Middle School 0.009 0.119** 0.100 -0.080*** -0.016 -0.051
(0.034) (0.053) (0.068) (0.021) (0.024) (0.036)
18836 16275 16214 18880 16315 16253
Grade 9 0.245*** 0.304*** 0.407*** 0.087* 0.136** 0.145**
(0.043) (0.058) (0.095) (0.043) (0.052) (0.072)
4439 3776 3668 4404 3747 3641
Grades 10 & 11 0.071 0.045 0.019 0.124** 0.135** 0.162***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.070) (0.057) (0.058) (0.050)
7260 6555 6416 7240 6515 6376
All High School 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.166*** 0.110** 0.136*** 0.160***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.061) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039)
11699 10331 10084 11644 10262 10017
Pooled Sample 0.071* 0.135*** 0.133** 0.002 0.052 0.023
(0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
30535 26606 26298 30524 26577 26270
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effects of attending a treatment school on Stanford 10 scores. Regressions follow the
three speciﬁcations described in the text: controlled OLS regression, difference-in-differences (DID), and a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) DID estimator. All speciﬁcations adjust for the student-level demographic variables summarized in Table A1, as well as
the student’s age and grade. OLS estimates also include previous year’s test scores as covariates. Standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% conﬁdence levels,
respectively.Appendix Table 9: Attrition
Outcome Treated Population Marginal Effect
Switch Schools Pre-Treatment 0.007
(0.031)
21318
Missing 2011 Math Final Treatment 0.006
(0.005)
34714
Missing 2011 Reading Final Treatment 0.006
(0.005)
34714
Missing 2010 Math Final Treatment 0.040**
(0.017)
34714
Missing 2010 Reading Final Treatment 0.038**
(0.016)
34714
This table presents the increase in the probability of several measures of attrition associated with attending a treatment
school. The results shown are the marginal effects calculated from a probit regression of the relevant dependent on a
treatment indicator and our list of control variables. In Row 1, treatment is assigned based on attendance during the
2009-10 school year, and the sample is restricted to students in 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th grades. In Rows 2-5, treatment
is assigned according to the ﬁrst school attended during the 2010-11 school year. Standard errors (in parentheses)




Appendix A: Implementation Guide 
 
School Selection 
During the 2010-2011 school year, four “failing” HISD high schools and five 
“unacceptable” middle schools were chosen to participate in the first phase of treatment. To be a 
Texas Title I Priority Schools for 2010 (i.e., “failing” school), a school had to be a Title I school in 
improvement, corrective action, or restructuring that was among the lowest achieving 5 percent of 
Title I Schools in Texas or any high school that has had a graduation rate below 60 percent. When a 
school is labeled as “failing,” a school district has one of four options: closure, school restart, turn-
around, or transformation.  The four "failing" high schools that qualified for participation in the 
treatment program in 2010-2011 were Jesse H. Jones High School, Kashmere High School, Robert 
E. Lee High School, and Sharpstown High School. 
“Unacceptable” schools were defined by the Texas Education Agency as schools that failed 
to meet the TAKS standards in one or more subjects for the 2008-2009 school year or failed to meet 
the graduation rate standard. The five “unacceptable” middle schools in HISD were: Crispus 
Attucks Middle School, Richard Dowling Middle School, Walter Fondren Middle School, Francis 
Scott Key Middle School, and James Ryan Middle School.
1
 
 We will treat “failing” and 
“unacceptable” schools with the same comprehensive turn-around model. 
Human Capital 
Many successful charter schools employ large central teams to handle the set of 
administrative and support tasks necessary to run a school so that the teachers and school leadership 
team can focus on instructional quality.  For the treatment program, HISD hired a School 
Improvement Officer (SIO) to work solely with the five middle and four high schools in the 
program.  The SIO was supported by a team of five people – two academic program managers, two 
data analysts, and one administrative assistant.  The SIO was the direct supervisor for the nine 
principals of treatment schools and provided them with support around all aspects of the program’s 
implementation in their schools.  The academic program managers provided support for the schools 
around particular aspects of the five strategies, especially teacher professional development, 
                                                 
1 Key Middle School was not officially labeled as an "Academically Unacceptable" school in 2008-2009.  
However, there a significant cheating scandal was discovered at Key after that year's test scores were 
reported.  Their preliminary "Unacceptable" rating for 2009-2010 suggests that without the cheating in 2008-
2009, they would have been rated similarly that year.  
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increased instructional time through double-dose courses, high-dosage tutoring, and data-driven 
instruction.  The data analysts supported schools by collecting data on student and school 
performance at regular intervals and providing this information to schools in an easily understood 
format; they also provided support for data-driven instruction.  Together, the team was tasked with 
ensuring that the school principals had the resources and support necessary to implement the five 
school turnaround strategies with fidelity. 
The principals at all nine of the treatment schools were replaced through a thorough, 
national search.  Two hundred school leaders were initially screened for the positions; seventy 
qualified for a final interview with Houston Independent School District (HISD) Superintendent 
Terry Grier and Dr. Roland Fryer.  Nine individuals were selected from this pool to lead the 
treatment schools.  Of the nine principals selected, three came from within HISD, four came from 
other school within Texas, and two came from other states.  Eight of the nine principals were 
experienced principals with records of increasing student performance in previously low-performing 
schools; the ninth had been a successful teacher and assistant principal in HISD before completing 
the Houston Aspiring Principals’ Institute program. 
Each of the nine principals met regularly with the SIO, both individually and as a group.  
Once a month, the entire leadership team would meet to conduct a learning walk at a specific school 
around a particular one of the five strategies and would then debrief about this visit, as well as 
discuss questions, concerns, and lessons learned over the most recent month.  On a weekly basis, 
the SIO and the central program team visited schools to gather information and provide 
observations and support specific to that campus. 
In partnership with The New Teacher Project, HISD conducted interviews with teachers in 
all nine of the treatment schools before the end of the 2009-2010 school year to gather information 
on each individual teacher's attitudes toward student achievement and the turnaround initiative.  In 
conjunction with data on teachers' past performance, this information was used to determine which 
teachers would be asked to continue teaching at the treatment schools.  In addition to normal 
teacher attrition due to resignations and retirement, 162 teachers were transferred out of the 
treatment schools based on the analysis of their past performance and their attitudes towards 
teaching.  In all, according to administrative records, 284 teachers left the nine treatment schools 




To replace these teachers, 100 new Teach for America corps members were hired by nine 
treatment schools.  Additionally, sixty experienced teachers with a history of producing student 
achievement gains transferred into these nine schools.  A bonus was offered to high-performing 
experienced teachers who transferred to the nine treatment schools through the program’s Effective 
Teacher Pipeline.  Teachers qualified for this program based on their calculated value-added in 
previous years and all teachers who qualified were invited to apply for positions in the five middle 
and four high schools.  Those teachers who ultimately transferred to a treatment school through this 
program earned a $10,000 annual stipend for the first two years. 
In order to develop the skills of the recruited and retained staff, a three-pronged professional 
development plan was implemented throughout the 2010-2011 school year.  Over the summer, all 
principals coordinated to deliver training to all teachers around the effective instructional strategies 
developed by Doug Lemov of Uncommon Schools, author of Teach Like a Champion, and Dr. Robert 
Marzano.  This training was broken down into ten distinct modules around instructional strategies - 
from “Creating a Strong Classroom Culture” to “Improving Instructional Pacing” - delivered in 
small groups by the principals over the course of the full week before the first day of school.  In 
addition to these instructional strategy sessions, teachers also received grade-level and subject-matter 
specific training around curriculum and assessment. 
The second prong of the professional development model was a series of sessions held on 
Saturdays throughout the fall of 2010.  These sessions were designed to increase the rigor of 
classroom instruction and covered specific topics such as lesson planning and differentiation.  These 
sessions were intended for all teachers, regardless of experience or content area. 
The third component was intended specifically for inexperienced teachers from the nine 
treatment schools.  Throughout the winter, new teachers were expected to attend Saturday 
professional development sessions geared toward issues that are in many cases unique to novice 
teachers, particularly around developing a teacher's "toolbox" for classroom management and 
student engagement. 
Beyond these three system-wide professional development strategies, each school developed 
its own professional development plan for all teachers for the entire school year, based on the 
specific needs of the teachers and students in that school.  Schools could seek professional 
development support from HISD, Texas Region IV, or other external organizations.  Additionally, 
most schools utilized a Professional Learning Community (PLC) model to maximize the sharing of 




Increased Time on Task 
HISD obtained a waiver from the Texas state legislature to allow for the extension of the 
school year in the nine treatment schools by five days.  For these schools, the school year began on 
August 16, 2010.  Additionally, the school day was lengthened at each of the nine treatment schools.  
The school day at these schools ran from 7:45am - 4:15pm Monday through Thursday and 7:45am - 
3:15pm on Friday.    Although school day schedules varied by school in the 2009-2010 school year, 
the school week for the treatment schools were extended by over five hours on average, which was 
an increase of slightly over an hour per day.  Within this schedule, treatment middle schools 
operated a six-period school day, while the high school schedules included seven periods per day. 
The extra time was structured to allow for high-dosage differentiation for all students in 
Apollo schools to ensure that it was effectively used to increase student performance.  All sixth and 
ninth graders in these nine schools received a minimum of an hour of two-on-one math tutoring 
within the school day each day.  Seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth graders received two 
class periods daily of either math or ELA, depending on in which subject each student needed more 
support.  More details on the implementation of high-dosage tutoring and double-dosing courses 
can be found in the following sections. 
 
High-Dosage Tutoring 
In order to deploy high-dosage tutoring for sixth and ninth graders in the nine treatment 
schools from the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year, HISD partnered with the MATCH School 
of Boston, which has been successfully implementing an in-school two-on-one tutoring model at 
their school since 2004. A team of MATCH consultants helped to recruit, screen, hire, and train 260 
tutors during the months of July and August 2010. Branded as "Give a Year, Save a Life", the 
experience was advertised throughout the Houston area and posted on over 200 college job boards 
across the country. 
Tutors were required to have a minimum of a bachelor's degree, display a strong math 
aptitude, and needed to be willing to make a full-time, ten-month commitment to the program.  A 
rigorous screening process was put into place in order to select 260 tutors from the more than one 
thousand applicants for the position.  Applicants' resumes and cover letters were first screened to 
determine if they would qualify for the next round. This screen focused on several key pieces of 
information – a candidate’s educational background, including degrees obtained, area(s) of study,  
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and college GPA; a candidate’s math skills, as observed by SAT or ACT math score, where available; 
and a candidate’s understanding of and dedication to the mission of the program, as displayed 
through the required cover letter. Approximately seventy percent of applicants progressed to the 
second stage. For local candidates, the second stage consisted of a full-day onsite screening session. 
In the morning, candidates were asked questions about their attitudes, motivation to take the 
position, and experience, and then took a math aptitude assessment. The math assessment consisted 
of twenty questions covering sixth and ninth grade math concepts aligned to the Texas Essential 
Knowledge and Skills (TEKS). In the afternoon, candidates participated in a mock tutorial with 
actual high school students and then were interviewed by representatives from the individual 
schools. Each stage of the onsite screening event was a decision point; that is, a candidate could be 
invited to continue or dismissed after each round. Additionally, before qualifying for a school 
interview, a candidate’s entire file was considered as a whole and candidates who had weakly passed 
several prior portions were not invited to participate in a school interview.   
For non-local applicants, those who progressed past the resume screen then participated in a 
phone screen based on the same set of questions used in the onsite screening event initial screen. 
Those who passed this phase took the same math aptitude assessment as local candidates and then 
participated in a video conference interview with school-based representatives. Non-local candidates 
were unable to participate in the mock tutorial portion of the screening process. 
In all, approximately 1200 applications for the tutoring position were received and 
processed. Over five hundred applicants participated in either an onsite screening day or the non-
local screening process. Two hundred eighty-seven tutors were hired, but thirty withdrew from or 
were removed from the program for various reasons. Ninety-two percent of tutors were from the 
Houston area, while eight percent relocated to Houston from across the country to participate in the 
program. 
In order to manage the 260 tutors that worked at the nine treatment schools during the 
2010-2011 school year, nine site coordinators were hired to oversee the daily operations of the 
tutoring program at each school. These site directors were personally identified by the principals of 
the nine schools as individuals who could effectively manage the tutors staffed to their school, as 
well as contribute their expertise to the daily implementation of the tutoring curriculum. 
Tutors completed a two-week training program prior to the first day of school that was 
designed by the MATCH consulting team in conjunction with district representatives. During the 
first week of the training all tutors were together and topics focused on program- and district-level  
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information and training that was relevant to all tutors. For the second week of training, all tutors 
were located on their campuses and training was led by school site coordinators according to the 
scope and sequence designed by the MATCH team. During the second week, tutors were given the 
opportunity to participate in whole-school staff professional development and learn the routines and 
procedures specific to their assigned schools. 
The tutoring position was a full-time position with a base salary of $20,000 per year. Tutors 
also received district benefits and were eligible for a bonus based on attendance and student 
performance. The student performance bonus was based on a combination of student math 
achievement (maintaining the high performance on TAKS of students already performing at or 
above the 80
th percentile) and student math improvement (improving a student’s math performance 
relative to peers on the TAKS). For the 2010-2011 school year, tutor incentive payments ranged 
from zero to just over $8000. A total of 173 tutors qualified for a student performance bonus and 
the average payment to these individuals was $3333. 
All sixth and ninth grade students received a class period of math tutoring every day, 
regardless of their previous math performance. The tutorials were a part of the regular class schedule 
for students, and students attended these tutorials in separate classrooms laid out intentionally to 
support the tutorial program. The all-student pull-out model for the tutorial component was 
strongly recommended by the MATCH consultants and supported by evidence from other high-
performing charter schools. The justification for the model was twofold: first, all students could 
benefit from high-dosage tutoring, either to remediate deficiencies in students’ math skills or to 
provide acceleration for students already performing at or above grade level; second, including all 
students in a grade in the tutorial program was thought to remove the negative stigma often attached 
to pull-out tutoring programs. 
During the first week of the school year, all sixth and ninth grade students took a diagnostic 
assessment based on the important math concepts for their respective grade level.  From there, site 
directors were able to appropriately pair students of similar ability levels with similar strengths and 
weaknesses in order to maximize the effectiveness of the tutorials. The tutorial curriculum was 
designed to accomplish two goals: to improve students’ basic skills and automaticity; and to provide 
supplemental instruction and practice around key concepts for the grade-level curriculum. To 
support these goals, the curriculum was split into two pieces for each daily tutorial. The first half of 
all tutorial sessions focused on basic skills instruction and practice.  The second half of each tutorial 
addressed specific concepts tested on the state standardized test (TAKS). The TAKS concepts  
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portion of the curriculum was split into units built around each TAKS objective and its associated 
state standards. Each unit lasted fifteen days; the first twelve days were dedicated to instruction, 
students took a unit assessment on the thirteenth day, and the last two days were devoted to re-
teaching concepts that students had not yet mastered. 
Student performance on each unit assessment was analyzed by concept for each student.  
Student performance on the unit assessment was compared to performance on the diagnostic 
assessment for each concept to determine student growth on each concept from the beginning of 
the school year. Student growth reports were organized by tutor and were shared with tutors, site 
coordinators, and school leadership. 
 
Double-Dosing Courses 
All students in non-tutored grades – seventh and eigthth in middle school and tenth through 
twelfth in high school – who were below grade level in math or reading entering the 2010-2011 
school year took a supplemental course in the subject in which they were below grade level.
2
The Carnegie Math curriculum uses personalized math software featuring differentiated 
instruction based on previous student performance. The program incorporates continual assessment 
that is visible to both students and teachers and is integrated into the overall instructional model. 
For reading double-dosing, the READ 180 model relies on a very specific classroom instructional 
model: 20 minutes of whole-group instruction, an hour of small-group rotations among three 
stations (instructional software, small-group instruction, and modeled/independent reading) for 20 
minutes each, and 10 minutes of whole-group wrap-up.  The program provides specific supports for 
special education students and English Language Learners. The books used by students in the 
modeled/independent reading station are leveled readers that allow students to read age-appropriate 
subject matter at their tested lexile level. As with Carnegie Math, students are frequently assessed to 
determine their lexile level in order to adapt instruction to fit individual needs. 
 
Supplemental curriculum packages were purchased for implementation in these double-dosing 
classes. The math double-dose course was built around the Carnegie Math program , while Read 180 
was used for the reading/language arts double-dosing courses. 
Due to delays in the contracting for the two computer software programs used in the 
double-dosing courses, the programs did not arrive in the treatment schools until October.  
                                                 
2 Students who were below grade level in both subjects received a double-dose in whichever subject they were 
further behind.  
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Teachers received training around the use of the programs and were provided with support around 
the implementation of the program from both the external vendor and the treatment program team. 
 
Data-Driven Instruction 
In the 2010-2011 school year, schools individually set their plans for the use of data to drive 
student achievement.  Some schools joined a consortium of local high schools and worked within 
that group to create, administer, and analyze regular interim assessments that were aligned to the 
TEKS.  Other schools used the interim assessments available through HISD for most grades and 
subjects that were to be administered every three weeks.  In some cases – such as for grade-subject 
combinations in which interim assessments were not available, instructional content teams within 
the schools designed their own interim assessments to monitor student learning. 
All schools were equipped with scanning technology to quickly enter student test data into 
Campus Online, a central database administered by HISD.  From there, teachers, instructional 
leaders, and principals had access to student data on each interim assessment.  The data were 
available in a variety of formats and could provide information on the performance of chosen sub-
populations, as well as student performance by content strand and standard. 




benchmark assessments in December, January/February, and March.  These benchmark 
assessments used released questions and formats from previous TAKS exams.  The program team 
assisted schools with collecting the data from these assessments and created reports for the schools 
designed to identify the necessary interventions for students and student groups.  Based on these 
assessment results, teachers were responsible for meeting with students one-on-one to set individual 
performance goals for the subsequent benchmark and ultimately for the end-of-year TAKS exam. 
Culture and Expectations 
The principal of each school played the pivotal role in setting the culture and expectations of 
the school, which is why the principal selection process needed to be as rigorous as it was.  In order 
to best foster the new culture of the treatment schools, however, certain practices were implemented 
from the top-down for all nine schools. 
In a meeting with the SIO, each principal set first-year goals for his school around 
expectations, a no-excuses culture, and specific targets for student achievement (e.g., percent at 
                                                 
3 This number varied based on the grade level and subject area of the course.  
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grade level and percent achieving mastery status for each grade and subject).  During training and 
professional development before students returned to school, teachers were trained around these 
expectations.  The first week of school at all nine treatment schools was dubbed "culture camp" and 
focused on instruction and behaviors/attitudes to ensure success in the schools.  Each school 
received a syllabus that outlined the necessary components of the first week of school.  There were 
certain non-negotiables, including: every classroom must have goals posted, every student must 
know what her individual goals are for the year and how they are going to achieve these goals, and 
every school must have visual evidence of a college-going culture. 
 
Implementation Monitoring 
In order to monitor the implementation of the five strategies in the treatment program, 
teams of researchers from EdLabs visited each of the nine treatment schools six times throughout 
the schools year, in October, November, December, February, March, and April.  During the first 
semester (the October, November, and December visits) two teams of two each visited four and 
five schools, respectively, for a full day each.  Teams arrived at the school building prior to the 
beginning of the school day in order to observe the school’s morning routine.  They then observed 
classes and tutorials for approximately two hours during the morning and observed the hallways and 
common areas during class transitions. A rubric was developed for use in classroom observations 
and was used consistently in all observations. The data was summarized at the school level for all 
classrooms. Around lunch time, the team conducted three separate focus groups: one with students, 
one with math tutors, and one with teachers. Each focus group contained five to eight participants 
and researchers used a pre-set script for these focus groups, designed to gather information from 
these three stakeholder groups that was not easily observable.  After focus groups, the team 
observed classrooms for the remainder of the afternoon and then observed the school dismissal 
routine.  At the end of the visit, the team met with the school leadership team in order to debrief 
around the observations from that day’s visit. Within a week, the principal received a brief executive 
summary that described the strengths and areas for improvement for the school, as well as a 
dashboard containing the school summary data from all of the classroom observations. During these 
full-day visits in the first semester, each team observed approximately 15-20 classrooms per school 
and spent an average of nine hours in each school. 
In the second semester (February, March, and April), the visits were shortened to a half-day 
visit each, but the content of the visits remained largely the same. Two teams of two each visited  
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each school, either in the morning or the afternoon; teams visited two schools per day.  Each visit 
consisted of classroom and tutorial observations; student, teacher, and tutor focus groups; and a 
meeting to debrief with the school leadership team. Instead of visiting 15-20 classrooms, 
observation teams visited 10-15 classrooms on average in each half-day school visit, and spent an 





 Appendix B: Variable Construction 
 
Attendance Rates 
Recall that treatment schools opened a week earlier than other district schools, but that attendance 
was not fully enforced during this week. We observe student attendance in each of six reporting 
periods – three per semester.  To minimize bias stemming from the early start, we restrict our 
attention to absences and presences that occur after the first reporting period of the year, though 
including the entire year’s attendance does not qualitatively affect our results. 
 
When calculating school-level attendance rates, we consider all the presences and absences for 
students when they are enrolled at each school.   
 
College Outcomes 
Information on college attendance and graduation comes from the National Student Clearinghouse 
(NSC), a non-profit organization that maintains enrollment information for 92 percent of colleges 
nationwide. We provided each student's full name and date of birth, which the NSC used to match 
to its database. The NSC data contain information on enrollment spells for all covered colleges that 
a student attended.  We code a student as having enrolled in college if she matches one or more 
enrollments in the NSC data.  We could a student as having entered a four year college if she ever 
attends a four year school. 
 
Economically Disadvantaged 
We consider a student economically disadvantaged if he is eligible for free or reduced price lunch, or 
if he satisfies one or more of the following criteria: 
•  Family income at or below the official federal poverty line,  
•  Eligible for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or other public assistance 
•  Received a Pell Grant or comparable state program of need-based financial assistance 
•  Eligible for programs assisted under Title II of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
•  Eligible for benefits under the Food Stamp Act of 1977. 
 
Graduation Rates 
Four year graduation rates are calculated by measuring the percentage of each high school’s 2005-06 
freshman class that graduates on time in 2010.  Students whose families move out of HISD before 
the end of the 2010 school year or who pursue private or home-schooling in the interim are 
removed from the sample. 
 
Gifted and Talented 
HISD offers two Gifted and Talented initiatives: Vanguard Magnet, which allows advanced students 
to attend schools with peers of similar ability, and Vanguard Neighborhood, which provides 
programming for gifted students in their local school.  We consider a student gifted if he or she is 
involved in either of these programs. 
 
Special Education and Limited English Proficiency 
These statuses are determined by XX and XX; they enter into our regressions as dummy variables.  
We do not consider students who have recently transitioned out of LEP status to be of limited 
English proficiency.  
 Suspensions 
The school-level count of suspensions includes both in-school and out-of-school suspensions, 
regardless of the nature of the infraction. 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
We code the race variables such that the five categories – white, black, Hispanic, asian and other –  
are complete and mutually exclusive.  Hispanic ethnicity is an absorbing state.  Hence “white” 
implies non-Hispanic white, “black” non-Hispanic black, and so on.  
 
Teacher Value-Added 
HISD officials provided us with 2009-10 value-added data for 3,883 middle and elementary school 
teachers.  In Table 2 and Figure 3, we present calculations based on the district-calculated 
Cumulative Gain Indices for five subjects: math, reading, science, social studies, and language.  We 
normalize these indices such that the average teacher in each subject has score zero and the sample 
standard deviation is one. 
 
Test Scores 
We observe results from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) and the Stanford 
10.  For ease of interpretation, we normalize all scores to have mean zero and standard deviation 
one by grade, subject, and year.  
 
Fifth and eighth graders must meet certain standards on their TAKS tests to advance to the next 
grade, and those who fail on their first attempt are allowed to take a retest one month later.  When 
selecting a score for students who take the retest, we select the retest score where it exists, though 




In order to minimize bias from attrition during the year, all students who start the year in a 
treatment school are considered “treated” regardless of how much time they spend enrolled in a 
treatment school. 
 Appendix C: Statistical Tests of Cheating at Treatment Schools 
 
This appendix investigates whether teacher or administrator cheating drives our 
results. While most investigations of cheating rely on examination of erasure patterns and 
the controlled retesting of students, Jacob and Levitt (2003) develop a method for 
statistically detecting cheating.  Their approach is guided by the intuition that teacher 
cheating, especially if done in an unsophisticated manner, is likely to leave blocks of identical 
answers, unusual patterns of correlations across student answers within the classroom, or 
unusual response patterns within a student’s exam. 
  Following Jacob and Levitt’s (2003) algorithm, we use four strategies to investigate 
the possibility of cheating at treatment schools.  First, we search for unusual blocks of 
consecutive identical answers given by multiple test-takers. Second, we look for unlikely 
correlation in answer responses within specific within classrooms. Third, we examine 
whether these correlations exhibit an unusually high variance in certain schools and grades. 
Finally, we measure whether students achieve a given aggregate score through an unlikely 
combination of correct answers.
1  
  We should note that there are more subtle ways teachers can cheat, such as by 
providing subtle feedback during the test or changing answers in a random way, that our 
algorithm is unlikely to detect.  Even when cheating is done naively our approach is not 
likely to detect every instance of cheating (see Jacob and Levitt (2003) for details and 
calibration exercises).  Our results should be interpreted with these caveats in mind. 
 
Suspicious Answer Strings 
  The quickest and easiest way for a teacher to cheat is to change the same block of 
consecutive questions for a subset of students in his or her class.  In this section we compare 
the most unlikely block of identical answers given on consecutive questions at treatment 
schools to the most unlikely block of answers at other HISD schools.  
  To find the most unlikely string of answers we first predict the likelihood that each 
student will answer they way they did on each question using a multinomial logit.  Unlike 
                                                 
1Jacob and Levitt (2003) also search for large, unexpected increases in test scores one year, followed 
by very small test score gains (or even declines) the following year.  Their identification strategy 
exploits the fact that these two types of indicators are very weakly correlated in classrooms unlikely 
to have cheated, but very highly correlated in situations where cheating likely occurred.  We cannot 
use this second measure, as it would require results from tests that have not yet been taken.   Jacob and Levitt (2003), we do not observe which answer students gave if their answer was 
wrong, so our possible outcomes are correct, incorrect, and missing. We estimate this model 
separately for each question in each grade and subject, controlling for test score performance 
in the previous year and our usual set of covariates.
2  A student’s predicted probability of 
choosing any particular response is therefore identified by the likelihood that other students 
(in the same year, grade and subject) with similar background characteristics and test scores 
choose that response. 
  Jacob and Levitt (2003) used Chicago Public Schools administrative data to 
determine the actual room students tested in, and they were able to to construct class-sized 
groups within which to analyze correlations using this information. Unfortunately, HISD 
testing procedures do not assign students to specific rooms or record how tests are 
administered logistically. Anecdotally, we determined that testing conditions varied widely 
from school to school. Some procedures included organizing students within homerooms, 
shuffling students around alphabetically within their grade level, and testing as a school or 
grade level in an auditorium setting. To approximate Jacob and Levitt’s (2003) method with 
these informational constraints, we have sorted the data by school and grade, so that each 
school-grade combination represents a group of responses to analyze for potential cheating. 
While testing may be conducted in a variety of different ways, it seems unlikely that tests 
would not at some point be organized at least by grade level, which is necessary for our 
method to detect tampering.              
  Using the estimates from this model we calculate the probability that a student would 
have answered a string of consecutive questions from item m to item n as he or she did by 
taking the product over items within each student.  We then take the product across all 
students in the classroom who had identical responses in the string.  We repeat this 
calculation for all possible consecutive strings of length three to seven, and take the 
minimum of the predicted block probability for each school-grade.  This measure captures 
the least likely block of identical answers given on consecutive questions in each grade at 
each school. 
                                                 
2 This procedure implicitly assumes that a given student’s answers are conditionally uncorrelated 
across questions on the exam, and that answers are uncorrelated across students. While this 
assumption is unlikely to be true in practice, because all of our comparisons rely on the relative 
unusualness of the answers given in different schools, this simplifying assumption is not likely to bias 
our results unless the correlation within and across students varies by school.  
Within-Group Correlation in Student Responses 
Our second measure relaxes the requirement that students provide identical 
consecutive strings of responses and instead looks for more general correlations within a 
given school-grade.  We first collect all the residuals from the multinomial logit model 
described above, giving us three estimated residuals per question per student.  We then sum 
the residuals for each possible response (correct, incorrect, or missing) to the school-grade 
level.  If students’ answers are conditionally independent, we would expect these sums to be 
approximately zero. 
  To create a single measure for each school-grade cell, we first square each residual 
measure to emphasize outliers and calculate the average across responses for each school-
grade cell on each question.  Using Jacob and Levitt’s (2003) notation, if eijgs denotes the 
summed residuals for response j on question i in grade g at school s, we calculate: 
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where ngs is the number of students in grade g at school s.  This leaves us with a measure that 
approximates the variance of responses on each question within each grade.  
The second measure is simply the school-grade-level average of these variances 
across all questions on the exam. 
 
Variance in Within-Group Correlation 
It is possible for within-group correlation to arise in the absence of cheating.  If a 
given school emphasizes a certain skill more than others, for instance, we would expect 
students to do especially well on that section of the test.  Therefore, we also calculate the 
within-group variance of vigs.  This constitutes our third measure. 
 
Suspicious Combinations of Correct Answers 
  The typical student will answer most of the easy questions correctly but get most of 
the hard questions wrong (where “easy” and “hard” are based on how well students of 
similar ability do on the question).  Therefore, in the absence of cheating we would expect 
two students with the same score to provide similar patterns of correct answers.    Our final test exploits this fact by identifying students who achieve a given score 
through an unlikely combination of correct answers.  We first group all the students who 
earn the same score on a given test.  Within these groups, we calculate the percentage of 
correct answers provided for each question.  This allows us to calculate a residual-like 
measure for each student response. If pis is the percentage of students with score s who 
answer question i correctly, then the residual is defined as 1-pis for students who answer 
correctly and pis for those answering incorrectly.  We then add the square of all these 
residuals for each student, yielding a total deviation measure D.  After demeaning these 
deviations within grades, we sum them to the school-grade level for our final indicator. 
 
   
 
 
Appendix D: Return on Investment Calculations 
 
When considering whether to expand our intervention into other districts, it is worthwhile to 
balance the benefits against the cost of the intervention. We therefore calculate a back-of-the-
envelope Internal Rate of Return (IRR) calculation based on the expected income benefits 
associated with increased student achievement.   
For simplicity, we calculate the rate of return using the pooled treatment effects for math 
and reading for a 14-year-old student who receives one year of treatment, enters the labor market at 
age 18, and retires at age 65.  Following Krueger (2003), let Et denote her real annual earnings at 
time t and   denote the percentage increase in earnings resulting from a one standard deviation 
increase in math or reading achievement. The IRR is the discount rate r* that sets costs equal to the 
discounted stream of future benefits: 
        
  
   






where    and    denote the treatment effects for math and reading and g is the annual 
rate of real wage growth.  
Krueger (2003) summarizes the literature on the relationship between test scores and income 
and concludes that   lies somewhere between 8 percent and 12 percent.  He also notes that real 
earnings and productivity have historically grown at rates between 1 percent and 2 percent, so these 
are plausible rates for g.  Recall that the incremental cost of our intervention is roughly $2,042 per 
student. We can approximate Et using data from the Current Population Survey. Setting  = 0.08 
and letting g vary between 0.01 and 0.02, we find that the IRR for our treatment is between 20.16 
percent and 20.62 percent. 
As tutoring is the most expensive component of the treatment, we might also consider the 
return on an intervention that relied solely on the other components.  Without tutoring, the cost of 
treatment falls to $1405 per student.  Using the average math treatment effect for non-tutoring 
grades, we find that the IRR falls between 21.66 percent and 22.39 percent, depending on one’s 
preferred value for g.  
For comparison, Fryer and Curto (2011) estimate that the IRR in “No Excuses” charter 
schools is 18.50 percent assuming a growth rate of 1 percent.  Similar calculations suggest that the 
return on investment is between 7 and 10 percent percent for an early childhood education program 
(Heckman 2003) and 6.20 percent for reductions in class size (Krueger 2000).  